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Major disasters are taking an ever-increasing toll on American
communities. To cope with this growing problem, Benton County is
seeking to adopt an alternative approach known as Community-
Based Emergency Preparedness. Its goal is to improve collaboration
among governmental agencies and the public to gain greater
flexibility in decision-making and implementation. Increased
community participation is intended to produce not only improved
emergency readiness, but also preparations in the home, school, and
workplace to reduce the effects of disaster when it strikes.
This case study describes strategies Benton County officials
have used to involve citizens in planning and preparing for disasters
during a twelve-month period from April, 1994 to April, 1995. A
recently formed citizen-initiated community coalition meets
regularly to organize public education forums and emergency
exercises. This is different from the past, when disaster planning
was undertaken only by professionals and specialists who tended to
leave the public out of the process. Public, private, and volunteer
groups at the community level are now seeking to create a dynamic
disaster planning process that reflects community values and
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CHAPTER 1
 
INTRODUCTION
 
There has been a dramatic increase worldwide in casualties and 
property losses due to natural disasters in recent years (Rosenfeld, 
1993: 5).  "The damage has increased three-fold from the 1960s 
through the 1980s, leaving more than 3 million dead ... and 800 
million displaced" (ibid.).  Geographers Burton, Kates and White (1993) 
link the rise in deaths and destruction in disasters worldwide to three 
principal factors: increase in population; movement of population to 
hazardous areas; and advances in the technology of recording disaster 
events (pp. 24-28).  Rosenfeld (1994) cites population increase as key: 
"As the population of the Earth has doubled from three billion of 1960, 
the annual losses due to disaster has grown almost ten-fold" (p.  1). 
In the United States, the trend is similar.  A 1994 Congressional 
report concluded:  "The cost of disasters, to the nation and to federal 
taxpayers, is on the rise.  Since 1989, there have been nine natural 
disasters in the U.S. that caused losses in excess of $1 billion each" (U.S. 
House of Representatives, December 14, 1994: 7).  This is the greatest 
total loss in any comparable period in American history. 
Spatial distribution of population is a second trend that 
magnifies disaster losses.  Burton, Kates and White (1993) wrote: "In 
virtually all countries, the predominant movement of the past half­2 
century has been from farm to town or city" (p. 25).  For example, in 
heavily populated and industrialized Tokyo, a combined earthquake, 
fire and tsunami may one day take a heavier toll of lives than if 
people had remained in their rural communities (ibid.).  Thus, more 
people are more vulnerable to risk in hazardous, densely populated 
regions. 
Changing Definition of a Hazard 
The definition of a hazard has changed as well.  Smith (1992) 
defines a hazard as a "potential threat to humans and their welfare" 
and risk as the "probability of hazard occurrence" (p. 6).  A disaster 
may be seen as "the realization of hazard" (ibid.).  Disasters include not 
only natural events, such as earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, lightning, 
landslides, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, cyclones, tornadoes, 
blizzards, forest fires, hailstorms and heat waves, but increasingly as 
human-induced or technological events, like massive civil  strife, 
hazardous waste emissions, oil spills, nuclear reactor melt-downs, 
possible global warming, and water and air pollution.  Disaster 
characteristics vary in terms of speed of onset, warning time, 
intensity, predictability, scope of impact, extent of destruction (Dynes, 
1970: 431).  Table 1  lists potentially hazardous environmental agents 
and examples. 
Need for Better Planning 
Policymakers are grappling with the problem of growing disaster 
losses.  Recent disasters have demonstrated that governmental 
agencies have failed to curb disaster losses, thus pointing out the 3 
Table 1:  Potentially Hazardous Environmental Agents and Examples
 
Type  of 
Agent
Atmospheric  Rain 
Freezing  rain 
Examples 
("glaze") 
Hail 
Snow 
Wind 
Lightning
Temperature ("heat wave" or "cold spell",  frost)
Thunderstorms 
Tornadoes 
Hurricanes 
Blizzards 
Drought 
Hydrologic  Flooding  (riverine)
lake and sea-shore wave action 
Waterlogging
Sea-ice and icebergs 
Runoff  drought 
Glacier  advance 
Geologic	  Mass-movements  (landslides,  avalanches,  mudflows, 
subsidence) 
Erosion  (foundations,  soils) 
Silting  (dikes,  rivers,  harbors,  farming)
Earthquakes 
Volcanic  eruptions 
Biologic  Severe epidemics in humans, plants, domestic and wild
animals 
Animal and plant invasions  (e.g.,  locusts) 
Forest and grassland  fires 
Technologic  Transport  accidents 
Industrial explosions and  fires 
Accidental releases of toxic gas
Nuclear power plant  failures 
War or Civil Strife 
Germ or nuclear warfare 
Source: Modified after Hewitt and Burton (1971) 
growing need for pre-disaster preparedness.  Catastrophes, such as the 
Loma Prieta (1989) and Northridge (1994) earthquakes, hurricanes 
Hugo (1989), Andrew (1992) and Iniki (1992), and the Midwestern 
floods (1993) have triggered new demands for disaster planning and 4 
mitigation strategies.  Mitigation is the elimination or reduction of the 
frequency and intensity of hazards (McLoughlin, 1985: 170). 
Mitigation requires the identification of risks to a community's health, 
safety, and welfare, and the implementation of a risk reduction 
program (Petak, 1985: 3). Disaster preparedness is defined as "the 
pre-arranged emergency measures which are to be taken to minimize 
the loss of life and property damage following the onset of disaster" 
(Smith, 1992: 88).  Measures include the promotion of public education 
and awareness programs, the development of evacuation plans, supply 
of medical aid, and the preparation of emergency food and shelter for 
evacuees (Smith, 1992: 88-89).  The goal is to make survival possible 
when emergency facilities and personnel are not immediately 
available. 
A key challenge for planners has been how planning processes 
can encourage citizens, especially those who live in hazardous areas, to 
learn about risks and to become better prepared themselves to deal 
with disasters.  Individual decisions, such as storing food and water, 
retrofitting  structures, and establishing pre-designated evacuation 
routes are making a difference. 
However, viable planning and mitigation strategies have been 
difficult for two reasons: unpredictability of events and an apathetic 
public.  One of the central themes in disaster research is the public's 
apparent indifference to hazard risks, and therefore, lack of 
involvement in planning precisely because most disasters cannot be 
forecast.  In the past, disaster policies relied on costly federal response 
and financial disaster assistance.  Little attempt was made to educate 
the public or work with them to mitigate hazard risks in their 5 
community or workplace.  Government officials charged with the 
responsibility to minimize loss of life and property damage have 
struggled with how to convince citizens to prepare.  It appears people 
are reluctant to invest in preparedness for a disaster that may never 
come.  Now, the prime objective of planners is to encourage citizens to 
take more responsibility for disasters readiness, and rely less on 
federal post-disaster relief assistance. 
Clearly, there is a need for strengthening public agencies in 
disaster planning by bolstering public involvement as well as other 
aspects.  In the United States, the lead organization responsible for 
disaster planning is the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA).  In the past FEMA has been criticized for limiting itself to "a 
crisis-reactive management approach" (Petak, 1985: 3).  Growing losses 
call for a proactive stance involving all aspects of the community in the 
areas of mitigation and preparedness. Some FEMA Region X officials 
suggest that "communities are the proper front-line level for 
emergency management, where people have face to face relationships 
and have a sense of community responsibility to each other" (FEMA 
Region X, 1994: 1).  During calamities, that level may be supplemented 
with more professional services only if and when needed.  At this time 
there is limited research on how this type of integrated planning has 
been done or could be done. 
This thesis will feature a case study that describes how one 
county in Oregon is trying a new approach to disaster planning to 
reduce future disaster losses.  It will trace the planning processes that 
local officials have undertaken to create a more effective planning 
procedure by engaging a larger portion of the community. 6 
One alternative approach to crisis-reactive management initiated 
by FEMA Region X is known as Community-Based Emergency 
Preparedness (CBEP).  It is the basic approach adopted by Benton 
County.  Emergency authorities would establish a more effective 
contact with the community and familiarize citizens with emergency 
planning and operations.  Officials at FEMA Region X support grass-
roots organization because their research shows that 80 percent of 
response efforts in the first 72 hours of recent major emergencies took 
place at the neighborhood and household levels (FEMA, 1994: 1).  With 
the CBEP approach, citizens, private businesses, schools, neighborhood 
groups, professionals, and hospital would participate in the planning 
process through emergency preparedness seminars and/or training 
courses (FEMA, 1994: 1).  From the planners' perspective, involving 
the public in the planning process could increase public trust in 
government, identify the community more closely with decision 
making, improve public services, and educate citizens (Alexander, 
1986: 105).  Taken together, this translates into greater self-
sufficiency and less reliance on immediate federal government 
assistance.  There has been limited research done on the Community-
Based Emergency Preparedness (CBEP) approach because it is so new. 
This thesis will attempt to look at empirical information on the 
planning process attempting to follow a community-based plan. 7 
CHAPTER 2
 
METHODOLOGY
 
Purpose and Main Objectives of Study 
The overall purpose of this study is: 
To describe how one county in Oregon plans and 
prepares, and mitigates for disasters related to its own 
goal of Community-Based Emergency Preparedness 
(CBEP). 
The six main objectives of this case study of Benton County are 
specifically: 
1.	  To compare the Traditional Emergency Management 
System (TEMS) and Community-Based Emergency 
Preparedness (CBEP) models specified by the researcher 
for this study with the emergency management approach 
in Benton County. 
2.	  To explain the organizational structure, roles, 
responsibilities, and priorities among federal, state and 
local governmental agencies that are responsible for 
disaster planning. 
3.	  To examine leadership style in a citizen participation 
disaster planning process. 
4.	  To describe citizen participation and decision making in 
the disaster planning process. 
5.	  To investigate the role of geoscientists, engineers and 
other experts in disaster planning. 8 
6.	  To determine the nature and outcome of disaster 
planning. 
Research Method 
The research methodology is a case study of disaster planning 
in one county in Oregon.  The study covers a twelve-month period 
from April 1994 to April 1995.  Case study methodology is one type 
of qualitative research that describes "a set of events and 
relationships within a given framework of ideas and procedures" 
(Hitchcock and Hughes, 1991: 214).  Ary et al. (1990) write that the 
ultimate goal of this type of inquiry is "to portray the complex 
pattern of what is being studied in sufficient depth and detail so that 
one who has not experienced it can understand it" (p. 445).  The case 
study is "a research strategy which focuses on understanding the 
dynamics present within a single setting" (Eisenhardt, 1989: 534). 
For example, Whyte's (1943) study of Cornerville; Selznick's (1949) 
description of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA); and Allison's 
(1971) analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis are three classic case 
studies that illustrated "how" and "why" questions about an event in a 
real-life context (Yin, 1989: 20).  The case study is the "method of 
choice when phenomena under study is not readily distinguishable 
from its context" (Yin, 1993: 3).  In other words, a case study 
methodology allows the researcher to preserve holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of actual incidents within organizations, 
processes, programs, and events (Yin, 1989: 22-23). 
For the purpose of this study, a single case represents an 
empirical inquiry to describe disaster planning in all  its real-world 9 
complexities.  Because the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are unclear, multiple types of information are used (Yin, 
1989: 23).  For this case study, data was collected from three sources: 
semi-structured interviews, documents, and participant observations. 
Triangulation, "using more than one method of data collection in a 
single study," checks validity of data, and verifies which data 
converge (Hitchcock and Hughes, 1991: 104).  Triangulation of 
methods ensures multiple perspectives, improves the quality of 
information, and provides cross-checks (Beebe, 1995: 2). 
Interviews 
The primary source of data was semi-structured interviews 
with a concerned citizen, emergency services coordinator, the sheriff, 
in addition to representatives at the state emergency agency, Oregon 
Emergency Management (OEM), and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) Region X.  Notes were taken during the 
interviews.  The typed notes were then given to these individuals to 
be verified for accuracy.  Corrections were made, and verified by 
informants.  Rather than use individual names of informants, it was 
decided to identify them by using either functional position title  (i.e., 
Sheriff, Emergency Services Coordinator) or by a descriptive phrase. 
For example, a "Key Informant" was an individual who had several 
roles in the Benton County planning process: chairperson, community 
activist and educator, concerned citizen, proposal writer, and policy 
maker.  To reduce possible confusion that more than one person 
served in these roles, all interviews from this individual were 10 
identified as Key Informant, as suggested in similar cases by Whyte 
(1984). 
All interviews were conducted at individuals' convenience 
usually during the day for those persons who worked for Benton 
County.  For the Key Informant, the interviews were conducted at her 
residence.  Over 38 hours of interviews took place during the 12 
months of the study.  The interviews took place in Oregon (Corvallis, 
Salem, Portland, and Bend), and at FEMA Region X offices in Bothell, 
Washington.  The bulk of the interviews were supplied by four 
individuals: Key Informant, Emergency Services Coordinator, Sheriff, 
and FEMA Region X representative.  Interviews ranged from 15 
minutes to 3 hours in length, in person or on the telephone. 
These interviews provided insight into the current policies and 
procedures taking place specific to disaster planning.  The goal of 
interviewing local officials was not only to gain knowledge of the 
planning process, but also to gain a better understanding of what they 
thought was and was not working in disaster planning in Benton 
County.  Appendix C contains documentation of these interviews. 
Documents 
Available government reports, legal documents, memorandum, 
and informational pamphlets and videotapes from federal,  state, 
county, and local agencies responsible for disaster planning were 
reviewed.  Emergency plans from other counties in Oregon, as well as 
plans from other states, were reviewed.  Specific documents, such as 
the Benton County budget, were also obtained.  These documents 11 
provided retrospective and prospective viewpoints on disaster 
planning policies. 
Another source of document data were source maps from 
various agencies, such as FEMA; Soil Conservation Service; Oregon 
Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI); U.S. 
Geologic Survey; and Benton County Public Works Department.  These 
data were used to determine the scientific basis for planning.  Digital 
maps displaying multiple hazards in Benton County were developed 
at Benton County Public Works Department.  The computer software 
program, Auto Cad Version 12, was used to depict hazards in 
relationship to population by different geographic areas.  These maps 
were verified for accuracy by geomorphologists, geologists, and 
engineers at Oregon State University, as well as specialists from 
Corvallis and Philomath rural fire protection districts, and Oregon 
Department of Forestry.  Documents that were reviewed as part of 
this study are listed in References. 
Participant Observations 
The final major source of data was participant observations 
similar to that used in ethnographic studies (Jorgensen, 1989).  One of 
the defining characteristics of ethnographic research is that the 
investigator goes into the field, instead of bringing the field to the 
investigator.  Orum, Feagin, and Sjoberg (1991) add that participant 
observations are useful "because investigators often can acquire a 
rendering of the activities only by participating in those activities (p. 
4).  Fitchen (1990) describes the goal of this type of qualitative 
research, "to see the world through the eyes of another person" (p. 12 
15).  Schwartzman (1993) states, "Ethnography is the trademark of 
cultural anthropology" (p.  1).  Malinowski (1922) describes 
ethnography as grasping "the native's point of view" (p. 25). 
For the purpose of this research, participant observations were 
conducted at Benton County Emergency Management Council bi­
monthly meetings, Benton County Commissioners meetings, Oregon 
Emergency Management annual meeting of county emergency 
managers, FEMA Region X Mitigation Forum, FEMA's Professional 
Development Series Planning Course, and Panel Discussions and 
Seminars at Oregon State University.  Also, participant observations 
were made during local and statewide emergency drills and 
exercises, training workshops, and public educational seminars, 
Council meetings, and state annual workshop.  Notes were taken 
during these events.  The observations were discussed and verified 
with individuals during subsequent interviews. 
At times, an event was observed with no participation by the 
researcher; other times, the researcher participated in the event.  For 
example, during Professional Development Series (PDS) training 
session on Disaster Planning (May 17-20, 1994), the researcher 
worked in small groups with county emergency planners throughout 
Oregon formulating emergency operations plans exercises.  Other 
examples were during 1994 (May 18, July 20, Oct. 19, Nov. 16,) and 
1995 (Jan. 18, March 15) Benton County Emergency Management 
Council meetings where the researcher asked questions to clarify 
information.  At other times, the researcher only observed and took 
notes.  During the course of this study, the researcher attended six 
Council meetings, two training sessions, three public awareness 13 
events, and one emergency drill.  Furthermore, the researcher made 
a presentation at the Oregon Academy of Sciences annual meeting at 
Reed College (Feb. 25, 1995), as well as a presentation at the March 
15, 1995, Benton County Emergency Management Council meeting in 
Corvallis.  Appendix C contains documentation of these participant 
observations. 
This research methodology was guided by general systems 
theory (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1979; Shafritz and Ott, 1991) which is 
appropriate when describing interrelated, complex issues such as 
disaster planning.  The following description captures key concepts: 
The systems approach facilitates analysis and synthesis in 
a complex and dynamic environment.  It considers 
interrelationships among subsystems as well as 
interactions between the system and its suprasystem and 
also provides a means of understanding synergistic 
aspects.  This conceptual scheme allows us to consider 
organizations -- individuals, small-group dynamics, and 
large-group phenomena -- all within the constraints of an 
external environmental system (Kast and Rosenzweig 
(1979:  17-18). 
While there are many variables that could be examined in 
disaster planning, this study focused on six characteristics: 
1. Organizational  structure 
2. Problem identification 
3. Leadership approach 
4. Citizen involvement 
5. Role of experts 
6. Outcome 
These six aspects are derived from broad themes which currently 
exist in disaster research literature.  Limiting this study to these six 14 
aspects establishes a framework to compare and contrast two 
conceptual disaster planning approaches: Traditional Emergency 
Management System (TEMS) and Community-Based Emergency 
Preparedness (CBEP).  Table 2 illustrates this case study's 
methodology of triangulating informational sources with the six 
process  characteristics. 
Table 2: Methodology for Triangulation 
Process  Semi- Documents  Participant 
Characteristics  Structured  Observation 
Interviews 
Organizational  4  4  4 
Structure 
Problem 
"NJ  4  A/ 
Identification 
Leadership  "\/  4  Ni 
Approach 
Citizen  4  4  4 
Involvement 
Role 
of Experts 
'\/  4  -\I 
Outcome  4  4  4 15 
CHAPTER 3
 
DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. DISASTER PLANNING
 
The historical overview will describe almost two centuries of 
disaster planning in the United States.  It includes interpretation of 
the evolution of emergency management as traced through 
legislative enactments, executive orders, policy development, and 
agency formation. 
Limited  Role  of Government (1803-1950) 
Until the latter part of the 19th century, there were no special 
efforts made for disaster planning at the national level.  In fact, 
Congress did not pass any disaster relief legislation until it granted 
financial assistance after a devastating fire razed the town of 
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in 1803 (Clary, 1985: 20).  Later, some 
local volunteer organizations formed to deal with calamities.  For 
example, disaster victims and their families depended on their 
community, church, relatives, and immediate relief services from the 
American Red Cross, a non-governmental agency founded in 1881 
(Rubin and Popkin, 1990: 79). 
Congressional legislation was considered on an ad hoc basis, 
and responded only to specific disasters.  Clary (1985) noted that 
from 1803 to the 1930s, only 100 such pieces of legislation were 
enacted (p. 20).  Today, the Comptroller General estimated that about 
35 Presidential disaster declarations have been issued each year 
(GAO/T-RCED-93-20, May 18, 1993: 6).  Since the scope of federal 
social services for disaster recovery has increased, a subsequent 16 
pattern of growing reliance on federal disaster relief assistance has 
developed by the state and local levels.  This is most evident in 
California, where Governor Wilson has declared a state of emergency, 
a move which triggers federal assistance, thirty times since 1991 
(Harper's Index, April, 1995: 13). 
New Deal Period (1930s) 
During the New Deal Era, a patchwork of agencies, departments, 
and councils were created.  Two federal agencies, the Public Works 
Administration (1930) and Works Progress Administration (1935), 
were established to stimulate the U.S. industrial recovery from the 
Depression by pumping federal funds into large-scale construction 
projects.  Many levees, dams, channels, and other structures were 
built by the Public Works Administration and Works Progress 
Administration as the result of the Flood Control Act (1936).  This 
enactment established a permanent federal role in dealing with flood 
hazards when it specified: 
The Federal Government should improve or participate 
in the improvement of navigable waters or their 
tributaries, including watersheds thereof, for flood 
control purposes if the benefits to whomsoever they 
may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs... 
(Viessman Jr., and Welty, 1985: 38). 
This legislation was the impetus to use the latest science, 
engineering and planning in order to prevent or lessen the impact of 
flooding.  With this Act, the federal policy approach began to rely 17 
upon scientific knowledge and technological principles to protect life 
and property (Waddell, 1977; Hewitt, 1983).  Despite the expenditure 
of an estimated $14 billion for flood control by the Army Corps of 
Engineers over a period of 40 years, flooding has remained a 
formidable hazard (May and Williams, 1986: 65). 
Expansion of Government:  Civil Defense Era (1950-70) 
In the 1950s, disaster planning evolved in the context of the 
Cold War.  The first legislation in the United States to deal with pre-
disaster planning on an on-going basis was the Federal Civil Defense 
Act and the Disaster Relief Act in 1950 (Dynes, 1990: 2; McLoughlin, 
1985: 166).  This Act provided assistance to states and local 
governments to repair roads and local government facilities in 
communities and states overwhelmed by large disasters to restore 
essential public services (U.S. House of Representatives, Dec. 14, 
1994: 7).  Individuals, voluntary relief organizations, and local and 
state governments were responsible for providing disaster services, 
while the federal government's role was supplementary (ibid.).  Local 
and state emergency agencies were required to formally request the 
federal government's assistance during disasters.  Furthermore, 
Congress intended the federal government to also share much of the 
fiscal and planning responsibilities with state and local governments 
(May and Williams, 1986: 111). 
In the 1950s, program implementation was assigned to the 
Secretary of Defense who set up the Defense Civil Preparedness 
Agency to handle emergency planning responsibilities.  A study by 18 
Dynes (1990) showed that emergency planners during the 
demobilization period following World War II were generally "ex­
military" personnel.  Previous military experience was the most 
critical and perhaps the only qualification for emergency planners 
(Dynes, 1990: 3).  Dynes found many local communities were unsure 
of what emergency planning entailed; the ex-military personnel 
tended to focus on civil defense issues while other disasters tended 
to be ignored. 
In 1958, the Civil Defense Act of 1950 was amended to clearly 
identify the responsibility of each level of government for civil 
defense.  The Act intended preparedness for nuclear attack to be a 
joint federal-state-local responsibility, and federal financial 
assistance was offered, but required that state and local jurisdictions 
match federal funds for personnel and administrative expenditures 
intended only for civil defense preparedness, not for natural 
disasters (Clary, 1986: 112). 
A Congressional-mandated study on civil defense concluded: 
"The American public was vulnerable to, and ill-prepared for, a 
Soviet ICBM nuclear attack" (Herken, 1987: 115; Sy lves, 1994: 304). 
This study urged President Eisenhower to undertake a vast civilian 
shelter program (Sy lves, 1994: 307).  By 1962, the threat of nuclear 
attack intensified, thus the need for civil protection and 
preparedness increased.  At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis 
during the Kennedy administration, the civil defense program 
reached its highest level of governmental support (May and 
Williams, 1986: 111).  In 1961, the National Fallout Shelter Survey 
Program was implemented to protect citizens from radioactive fallout 19 
during a nuclear attack.  Congress appropriated $294 million for civil 
defense in fiscal year 1962 (May and Williams, 1986: 111-112). 
Military concerns dominated disaster planning at the federal level, 
while preparedness for natural disasters was neglected.  In contrast, 
at the local level, concerns about disaster planning were based less 
on military and more on non-attack related disasters (i.e., 
earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods).  This brought confusion about 
how the federal, state and local agencies defined their respective 
emergency management roles. 
Local  Civil Defense Offices  (1960s) 
During the late 1960s, Quarantelli (1988) examined the 
organizational structure of local civil defense offices, or city and 
county agencies that took on core responsibilities for disaster 
planning.  He found wide variation in the purpose, structure, and 
functions of selected local civil defense offices (p. 2).  For example, 
some local civil defense organizations emphasized natural disaster 
concerns; others did not.  Some were autonomous groups; others 
were integral parts of other organizations in the governmental 
structure.  Additionally, federal civil defense agency officials began 
to consider whether they should standardize local offices or not 
(ibid.) 
The Quarantelli (1988) study showed that during the 1960s 
few communities were well-organized for serious disaster.  Indeed, 
the overall picture looked dismal.  For instance, local offices often 
failed to set up an Emergency Operating Center (EOC), which was 
considered vital for maintaining communication and coordinating 20 
response efforts during emergencies.  There were no written disaster 
plan blueprints for them to follow.  Since natural disaster 
preparedness planning was secondary to civil defense issues, 
emergency response by local offices was "problem plagued" (p. 4). 
Quarantelli (1988) also discovered that local emergency agencies did 
not have the capability to deal with both attack-related civil defense 
preparedness and non-attack related  disasters. 
By the 1970s, federal emergency management efforts were 
being criticized by state and local officials (May and Williams, 1986: 
35).  As the threat of enemy attack subsided, the national civil 
defense program was expanded to cover "dual use" (both civil 
defense and natural disaster preparedness).  This policy allowed 
state and local governments to use federal civil defense funding for 
natural disaster preparedness.  Local emergency agencies welcomed 
this change in policy since they could use personnel, equipment, and 
facilities for responding to natural or civil defense incidents. 
However, a serious conflict ensued.  While states were told they 
could use federal funding for natural disaster planning, federal 
policies continued to favor funding for civil defense planning (Settle, 
1985: 101).  Increasingly, policies at the community level focused on 
local emergencies.  Local policy, which was shaped by natural 
disasters, clashed with national policy, which was driven by security 
issues.  Consequently, planning efforts were further divided between 
local and federal levels. 21 
Increase  in  Disaster  Legislation  (1960s-1970s) 
Key federal legislation regarding hazard reduction and disaster 
relief and recovery was enacted during the 1960s to 1970s (Clary, 
1985: 26).  Two main characteristics of federal legislation, which is 
summarized in Table 3, are: (1) legislation includes both structural 
and non-structural approaches to hazard mitigation; and (2) disaster 
legislation is mostly enacted following calamities.  (For state and local 
mitigation legislation and discussion, see Table 5). 
Analyzing the first column "pre-disaster mitigation and 
prevention," it  is apparent that early federal hazard policies 
concentrated on a more structural approach to flood prevention, such 
as the Flood Control Act of 1936, whereas more recent federal hazard 
policies took a non-structural approach to preserve and restore 
natural floodplains in 1977 (Executive Orders 11988 and 11990). 
Federal policies initially attempted to control flooding by building 
dams and other structures.  By the 1960s-1970s, some legislation 
had been passed that incorporated alternative, non-structural means 
to prevent hazard events such as insurance, and preservation of 
natural floodplains. 
Scholars note that quite often legislation passed soon after 
disasters (May, 1985; Rossi, Wright, Weber-Burdin, 1982).  It 
appears that Congress took a reactive approach when it passed 
disaster legislation in the aftermath of Hurricane Camille in 1969. 
This calamity, which killed over 250 people in Louisiana and 22 
Table 3:  Federal Hazard Policies and Related Developments by Stages
 
of Emergency Management
 
Level  Pre-Disaster 
Mitigation  and 
Prevention 
Feder al	  *Corps of Engineers 
Structural flood control 
program (Flood Control Act 
of 1936) 
Cirrus and Stormfury 
hurricane seeding projects 
(1947-1973) 
*Flood hazard maps & 
floodplain management plan 
(National Flood Insurance 
Act of 1968) 
*Funds for state coastal land-
use planning (Coastal Zone 
Management Act of 1972) 
*Inspection of nonfederal 
dams (National Dam 
Inspection Act of 1972) 
* Public recipients of disaster 
relief funds must evaluate 
natural hazards and take 
action to mitigate them 
(Sect. 406, Disaster Relief 
Act of 1974) 
*Mandates development of 
earthquake prediction 
methodology, Sect. 5 (c), (2), 
Earthquake Hazard Reduction 
Act of 1977 
Preservation and 
restoration of natural 
floodplains (E.O. 11988 
and 11990, 1977) 
Pre-Disaster 
Preparedness
and  Disaster 
Response 
*Procedures establishing 
disaster declaration 
(Disaster Relief Act of 
1950) 
State grants for disaster 
relief planning (Sec. 8, 
Disaster Relief Act of 
1969) 
*Creation of Federal 
Emergency Management 
Agency (E.O. 12127, 
1979) 
Emergency Planning 
and Community Right-To-
Know (Superfund, SARA 
Title III) (1986) 
*FCC Updated Emergency 
Broadcast System with 
new Emergency Alert 
System (1994) 
Post-Disaster 
Recovery 
*Creation of Federal 
Crop Insurance 
Corporation (Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938 
*Administrative 
framework for disaster 
relief (Disaster Relief Act 
of 1950 and subsequent 
acts and amendments 
*Disaster-specific relief 
acts, often expanding aid 
programs (e.g., 
*Pacific Northwest 
Disaster Relief Act of 
1965) 
*Flood Insurance 
(National Flood Insurance 
Act of 1968) 
*FEMA administrative 
rule establishing non-
negotiated cost split 
(1980) 
*National Flood 
Insurance Reform Act of 
1994 was passed to 
inform lender compliance 
and inform flood-plain 
property buyers and 
owners of flood insurance 
purchase requirement 
Source: Modified from Clary, 1985: 26
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Mississippi, became the driving force for Congress to pass the 
Disaster Relief Act of 1970.  This Act mandated that: 
jurisdictions receiving federal aid must evaluate 
natural hazards and take measures to mitigate 
them, the purpose being to prevent reoccurrence of 
the disaster or lessen its impact (Section 406) 
(Clary, 1985: 25). 
Legislators assumed that states and LEMAs implementing mitigation 
activities would reduce the future impact of natural disasters, and, 
consequently, the demand for federal assistance (This objective has 
yet to be realized). 
Congress has been criticized for being overly optimistic about 
the means available to accomplish the goal of predicting earthquakes 
(ibid.).  For instance, one section of the Earthquake Hazards Reduction 
Act (1977) required: 
The implementation in all areas of high or moderate 
seismic risk, of a system (including personnel, 
technology, and procedures) for predicting 
damaging earthquakes and for identifying, 
evaluating and accurately characterizing seismic 
hazards (Section 5 (c)(2), 1977). 
In addition to the typical administrative problems, such as planning, 
staffing, and organizing, legislators neglected a key factor: the 
limitations of earthquake prediction technology (Clary, 1985: 21). 24 
Therefore, legislation enacted in the aftermath of disasters may be
 
impractical and counterproductive. 
Formation of Federal Emergency Management Agency  - 1979 
The federal government's role in emergency management 
became more defined in the late 1970s when President Carter sought 
to integrate all the agencies under one umbrella agency.  In 1978, 
Carter submitted Reorganization Plan No. 3 to Congress to consolidate 
the federal responsibilities for the purpose of emergency 
management (Executive Order 12127, 1979).  Many applauded this 
reorganization plan for centralization because the federal disaster 
system had been fragmented and uncoordinated (Clary, 1985: 21). 
In 1979, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
was created in order for the federal government to assume more 
authority and offer resources when state and local governments 
needed emergency assistance.  FEMA took over a number of earlier 
agencies including the National Fire Prevention and Control 
Administration, the Federal Insurance Administration, the Federal 
Emergency Broadcast System, the Federal Disaster Assistance 
Administration, and Federal Preparedness Agency, in addition to the 
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, the principal civil defense agency 
that had been a subsidiary of the Department of Defense 
(McLoughlin, 1985: 166-167). FEMA was to act as a coordinating 
body over 27 other federal agencies and the American Red Cross.  It 
was mandated by Congress to create and implement programs 
dealing with flood control, dam safety, earthquake mitigation, and 
preparedness (FEMA, 1992; May and Williams, 1986).  It was also 25 
responsible for giving federal assistance directly to citizens 
recovering from disasters (Sy lves, 1994: 303).  Hence, the agency, 
with nearly 2,600 full-time employees had a complicated task to 
coordinate a wide range of programs among various levels of 
agencies. 
Since the early 1980s, FEMA has promoted a coordination 
strategy known as Integrated Emergency Management System 
(IEMS) (Clary, 1985; Petak, 1985; McLoughlin, 1985; May and 
Williams, 1986; Sy lves, 1994).  The IEMS approach intended to shift 
from a narrow, single hazard program orientation (e.g., civil defense) 
to a broader, multi-hazard planning approach (McLoughlin, 1985: 
166).  Integrated also refers to incorporating four interrelated 
emergency management components (mitigation,  preparedness, 
response, and recovery) into state and local agencies emergency 
programs.  These four integral parts are: 
1. Mitigation: Activities which eliminated hazards, 
reduced the probability of their occurrence, or reduced 
the disastrous effects of unavoidable hazards.  In order to 
alleviate the impact or prevent a hazardous event, one 
might strengthen building codes standards, retrofit 
structures or change land-use planning requirements. 
2. Preparedness: Emergency plans were developed 
to save lives and minimize damage.  This included 
creating warning systems and other means in advance to 
minimize damage. 
3. Response:  Activities which provide emergency 
assistance during and immediately after a disaster 
strikes.  This included search and rescue, and providing 
food, shelter, and clothing. 
4. Recovery:  Restoring social systems after disaster 
impact, by developing programs to allow individuals to 
rebuild.  The long-term reconstruction of a community 26 
implemented over a period as long as 10 years 
(McLoughlin, 1985: 166; Clary, 1985: 20; Petak, 1985: 3). 
Re-birth of  Civil Defense (1980s) 
FEMA embraced an all-hazards approach, as opposed to a single 
hazard approach (i.e., civil defense), to disaster planning starting in 
the late 1970s with President Carter.  This approach was defined as 
"a functionally-oriented capability that may be applied to all hazards 
or any type and size of disaster" (FEMA, 1994).  However, during the 
1980s, the Reagan Administration re-established civil defense as an 
important element in upgrading national defense policy (May and 
Williams, 1986: 40).  In 1981, Congress amended the Civil Defense 
Act (P.L. 97-86) so that states could use federal funds for: 
Preparing for and responding to natural disasters to the 
extent that the use of such funds for such purposes is 
consistent with, contributes to, and does not detract from 
attack-related civil defense preparedness (Section 207). 
The Reagan Administration's strong domestic civil defensive strategy 
is best illustrated by six years of research funding of over $17 billion 
dollars to protect the nation with SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) 
(Time, June 26, 1989: 20).  According to a 1994 General Accounting 
Office (GAO) report, this conflict between civil defense and all-hazard 
planning still continues (GAO/T-RCED-93-20: 23).  It claimed that 
FEMA's domestic emergency management staff and its national civil 
defense staff are still divided (National Academy of Public 27 
Administration report, 1993: 53-54; Sylves, 1994: 304).  NAPA's 
report disclosed: 
About 38 percent of FEMA's total staff and about 27 
percent of its budget (excluding the disaster relief fund) 
is now dedicated to national security emergencies; 
foremost among them is all-out nuclear war (NAPA, 
Coping with Catastrophe  ,  1993: 53). 
The report claimed FEMA was maintaining a top secret program of 
civil defense at a time when the threat of nuclear attack had 
diminished (Cox News Service, Feb. 23, 1993).  At a time when there 
was little danger from nuclear attack, FEMA spent more than $1.3 
billion on equipment, support facilities, and personnel to provide 
communications for government leaders in the event of a nuclear 
war, which was "roughly 12 times more than the $243 million FEMA 
spent during those 10 years preparing for natural disasters" (ibid.). 
Meanwhile, FEMA continued to neglect local planning and 
response activities as the country was inundated with a variety of 
natural and human-induced calamities.  Technological catastrophes at 
Three Mile Island (March 1979), as well as overseas at Chernobyl 
(April 1986) and Bhopal (December 1984) cost billions in recovery 
efforts.  Furthermore, risks from transporting hazardous materials 
were increasing.  In 1985, McLoughlin wrote, "Four billion tons of 
hazardous materials move through the (U.S.) transportation system 
each year" (p.  165).  In response, growing concern about hazardous 
materials incidents led to the enactment of the Emergency Planning 
and Community-Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (Hadden, 1989; 28 
Bolstridge, 1994).  This Act was meant to provide citizens with 
information to plan for emergencies involving the release of 
dangerous chemicals.  The measure also required each state to 
establish Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs).  Over 4,000 
local emergency planning districts have been established, however 
five of the State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs) 
designated the entire state as one district, including Oregon (EPA, 
1990).  These groups are supposed to gather and disseminate 
information on hazardous chemicals in a community. 
Stafford  Act  (1988) 
In 1988, federal responsibilities were re-defined again in the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 
93-288) to improve disaster response and set federal rules and 
limitations.  It was intended to clarify the responsibilities of each 
level of government following disaster.  The Act sought to improve 
inter-government communication, and to understand capabilities and 
limitations.  The Act listed six responsibilities of FEMA: 
1.	  Revising and broadening the scope of existing 
disaster relief programs (to include an all-
hazards approach); 
2.	  Encouraging the development of comprehensive 
disaster preparedness and relief program; 
3.	  Achieving greater coordination and 
responsiveness of disaster preparedness and 
relief programs; 
4.	  Encouraging individual, state and local 
governments to protect themselves by obtaining 29 
insurance coverage to supplement or replace 
governmental  assistance; 
5.	  Encouraging hazard mitigation measures to 
reduce losses from disasters, including 
development of land use and construction 
regulations; and 
6.	  Providing federal assistance programs from 
both public and private losses sustained in 
disasters (Stafford Act, 1988, Section 101 (b):  1). 
Section 407 of the Stafford Act required state and local 
governments who were receiving federal disaster assistance to 
prepare a plan for averting recurrence of losses.  If communities 
were unwilling to plan, the federal government had the authority to 
withhold future disaster assistance (May and Williams, 1986: 8-9). 
Hence, FEMA had some leverage to influence LEMAs and state 
agencies to re-evaluate non-structural mitigation, land use, building 
codes standards and technical assistance. 
Re-evaluating  Local Emergency Management Agencies  1980 
Quarantelli (1988) completed a follow-up study marking the 
progress and problems of local emergency management agencies 
(LEMAs) since the 1960s when he analyzed local civil defense offices. 
As with the previous 1960s study, the 1980s research revealed that 
there was still tremendous diversity in the structure, location, 
mission, responsibility, funding, and role among local agencies, as 
seen in Table 4.  For instance, some LEMAs were located within the 
Mayor's office, while others were an added-on responsibility within 
the fire, public safety, or even streets and sanitation departments. 
Some LEMAs were a lead agency, or completely independent city or 30 
county agency.  Tasks were prioritized according to local or national 
needs, as seen with the all-hazards mission or war-time orientation. 
However, types of functions and responsibilities often depended 
upon the level of support and funding.  Many relied on a combination 
of city-county-state-federal financial assistance.  For example, some 
LEMAs with a part-time employee could only handle being an 
information gatherer during an emergency. 
Some local governments appropriated more local funds, which 
enabled them to hire more personnel or buy equipment.  Thus, some 
LEMAs could offer more services (i.e., temporary housing, victim 
counseling) than others. 
Heterogeneity of LEMAs reflected local community conditions 
and local history (Quarantelli, 1988: 4).  LEMAs mirrored the varied 
conditions which are found in different communities.  Quarantelli 
(1988) predicted that if FEMA tried to further standardize disaster 
planning, LEMAs would become artificial entities without local roots 
(p. 4).  Moreover, Quarantelli maintained, if a federal model was 
imposed, communities would consider it outside interference. 
Quarantelli's findings were based on 20 years of research:  There is 
no universal best model for disaster planning and mitigation. 
Another finding from the Quarantelli study was an increase in 
the quantity and quality of disaster preparedness activities 
undertaken by local agencies from 1960 to 1980.  The study found 
that improvements in disaster preparedness were not "across-the­
board," however, some types of local offices appeared to be better at 
planning than others (p. 6).  It was found that communities that went 
through a process of disaster planning (i.e., meetings, community 31 
Table 4: Examples of Heterogeneity among Local Emergency 
Management Agencies (LEMAs) 
Types of Heterogeneity  Examples 
Division of Emergency Assistance & Preparedness 
Department Names  Office of Civil Defense 
Emergency Preparedness Group 
Bureau of Civil Emergency 
Emergency Management Agency 
Civil Defense and Preparedness Bureau 
Disaster Emergency Services 
Dept. of Streets & Sanitation 
Location of  Division of Public Safety
 
Organizational Structure  Staff within Mayor's Office
 
(apart from city/county)  Chief Administrative Office of the County
 
Part of Fire Department 
Independent city and/or county agency 
Only natural disasters 
Mission	  All-hazards (sudden natural/technological hazards) 
Those involved with 9-1-1 systems 
Counter-terrorism activities 
Homeless and poverty programs 
Some only have wartime orientation; others only 
peacetime 
Emergency preparedness & response 
Tasks/Responsibilities	  Focus on mitigation and recovery tasks 
Land-use Planning 
Building Codes 
Regulation of Hazardous Material 
Temporary Housing 
Victim Counseling 
Redevelopment Loans 
Planning for Evacuation 
Damage Assessment and Control 
Search and Rescue 
Combination city-county-state-federal or only local 
Funding	  funding 
Some have very sparse budgets 
Few have large budgets for special tasks/missions 
Different degrees of emphasis on: 
Major Role  =	 Planning 
Resource Provider 
Coordination 
Information Gatherer 
Might be an isolated activity 
Part of interorganizational core 
A lead agency 
Source: Adapted from Quarantelli, 1988: 4-5 32 
education, and public involvement) were better prepared than 
communities that only had a Standard Operation Plan (SOP) on paper 
(ibid.).  Again, these findings emphasized the importance of the 
process of disaster planning rather than the disaster plan itself. 
It appears that FEMA has not fulfilled its responsibilities as 
outlined in the Stafford Act, which charged the agency with 
monitoring and measuring state and local preparedness.  A 1993 GAO 
report uncovered shortcomings with how FEMA helped state and 
local government officials train and conduct exercises in anticipation 
of disasters (p. 23).  Most state officials told the GAO that their state 
disaster exercises did not adequately prepare them to respond to 
disasters.  These officials cite such problems as too few exercises, low 
federal participation, and failure to act on weaknesses identified (p. 
24).  In terms of measuring effectiveness, the GAO report concluded: 
Greater preparedness and accountability for state 
and local governments are needed to ensure that 
they can respond to disasters.  However, FEMA is 
neither organized for, nor carries out, the type of 
oversight needed to ensure that deficiencies are 
identified and corrected.  FEMA Headquarters sets 
policies and establishes training programs but does 
not monitor state performance.... Regional officials 
told GAO that headquarters has neither established 
performance standards nor developed a program for 
evaluating state and local preparedness for disaster 
response.  Therefore, the regions have no uniform 
national standards that can be used to judge state 
and local readiness (p. 25). 33 
State and Local Mitigation  Initiatives  (1960s) 
Starting in the 1960s, several state and local entities began to 
pass their own legislation when the federal government's disaster 
planning policies appeared to be inadequate (See Table 5).  This 
signified a resurgence of innovative policy initiatives at the state and 
local level to respond to special state needs, specifically mitigation 
and hazard activities (Hadden, 1989).  For example, one section of 
Oregon passed a Statewide Land-Use Plan (Goal No. 7, 1973) which 
also focused on natural hazards.  This legislation required each 
locality to inventory hazards and locate damage-prone development 
in risk areas in their comprehensive plans. 
Other examples of state initiatives included California's Cobey-
Alquist Act (1965), which required local floodplain regulations to be 
consistent with state standards (Clary, 1985: 22).  If they were not, 
the state would not participate in cost-sharing on federal flood 
control projects (Clary, 1985: 22).  Next, the Flood Relocation and 
Land Exchange Law (1979) allowed Arizona to designate land as 
flood-prone, condemn private lands within these areas and exchange 
state land for these properties (Clary, 1985: 22).  And the Alquist-
Priolo Special Studies Zone Act (1972) required geologic maps of 
known seismic zones to be made in California.  Local governments 
were required to use these seismic risk maps in making land-use 
decisions regarding proposed projects (ibid.). 
In addition to state mitigation legislation, cities and counties 
also passed similar controls such as easements, acquisition, or 
moratoria (Clary, 1985: 25-26).  (See Table 5).  One explanation of 
locally initiated hazard policies may be a high level of exposure to 34 
hazards.  For instance, in areas with a history of catastrophes, such as 
earthquake-prone California and/or hurricane-susceptible  Florida, 
the likelihood of action appears to be higher.  For example, Los 
Angeles passed an ordinance that required certain types of pre-1938 
buildings with unreinforced masonry bearing walls to be retrofitted 
to withstand earthquake shocks. 
Table 5: State and Local Emergency Agencies Initiatives for Disaster 
Mitigation 
Level 
Gove  tit  nd 
Disaster  Mitigation
Prevention  Initiatives 
Local floodplain regulations must be consistent with  state 
standards (Cobey-Alquist Floodplain Management Act of 
1965-California) 
Regulation of construction practices  in  zones of known 
seismic hazard (Alquist-Priolo Special Studies Zone Act of 
1972-California) 
Natural hazard prevention  as  a goal of comprehensive 
statewide planning (Oregon Statewide Land-Use
Planning Program-Act of  1973) 
State land trade for property in floodplains (Arizona 
Flood Relocation and Exchange Law of 1979) 
Legislation is passed Florida in 1991 allowing fees to be 
collected  from insurance companies  for emergency 
planning  trust  fund 
Counties and cities have passed regulations for disaster
mitigation and other hazard control  techniques:
Risk zoning
Subdivision  control 
Hazard building codes
Acquisition of hazard areas
Hazard-prone land  leased  with 
Hazard easements 
restrictive  covenants 
Development  moratoria 
Growth  controls 
Source: Modified after Clary, 1985: 26 
Another example of local governments taking the lead in hazard 
mitigation is seen in Cowlitz County, Washington, following Mt. St. 35 
Helen's eruption, May 18, 1980 (ibid.).  The county enacted a 
moratorium on growth in areas subject to volcano-related flooding. 
In Sanibel Island, Florida, a growth lid was established according to 
the number of people who could be evacuated in the event of a 
major hurricane (Clary, 1985: 22).  Lastly, in St. Petersburg, Florida, 
hazard maps called "Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes" 
(SLOSH) were created by National Oceanic Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) to show specific areas most susceptible to 
flooding (Pinellas County, Florida, Emergency Services, August, 1991). 
Overall, state, county, and local entities assume that these examples 
of hazard mitigation initiatives may reduce immediate and long-term 
costs to areas vulnerable to hazard risks. 
Re-evaluating FEMA (1990s) 
During the early 1990s, prompted by state and local initiatives 
and rising costs of disasters, FEMA started to take a hard look at 
mitigation and pre-disaster preparedness.  The United States was hit 
by several devastating and costly disasters: Hurricane Hugo 
Southeastern U.S. and Caribbean (1989), Loma Prieta-San Francisco 
Bay Area earthquake (1989), Hurricane Andrew  Caribbean, Florida 
and Louisiana (1992), and the Mississippi Flooding (1993).  Many 
criticized FEMA's response during these catastrophes (Schneider, 
1992; Rubin and Popkin, 1990; NAPA, 1994).  For example, after 
Hurricane Hugo hit South Carolina in 1989, many people perceived 
FEMA as slow and inept.  Senator Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.) called FEMA 
employees "a bunch of bureaucratic jackasses" (Rubin and Popkin, 
1990: 16).  Schneider (1992) also wrote: 36 
Hollings claimed FEMA was more concerned with 
regulations, forms, assessments, and inspections 
than with helping those in need.  These statements 
led to the widespread perception that FEMA was 
ineffective, inefficient, and unresponsive (p.  139). 
By creating FEMA, the Carter administration sought to improve 
interagency and intergovernmental coordination.  Reputedly, FEMA 
has been unable to effectively coordinate preparedness, response, 
relief, and recovery efforts among various local, county, state, and 
federal agencies.  For example, during Hurricane Hugo in South 
Carolina, the local emergency management agencies were essentially 
untrained and unprepared for such devastation, thus requiring state 
and federal assistance.  Victims thought the federal government was 
primarily responsible for relief efforts, even though the response 
system depended on state and local guidance (Schneider, 1992: 139). 
Moreover, Schneider (1992) added: "Even when government follows 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), their actions often appeared 
to be inappropriate for the situation at hand" (Schneider, 1992: 139­
140).  Subsequently, FEMA's disaster relief efforts in South Carolina 
were perceived as inadequate. 
FEMA has faced other criticism, such as overspending while 
failing to prevent much death and destruction.  For instance, a 
bipartisan task force on disaster preparedness of the House of 
Representatives (December 14,  1994) reported these figures: 
The cost of disasters, to the nation and to federal 
taxpayers, is on the rise.  Since 1989, there have been 
nine natural disasters in the United States that caused 37 
losses in excess of $1 billion each.  The Northridge 
Earthquake in 1994 claimed 61 lives and inflicted 
approximately $25 billion in losses.  The Midwest 
Floods of 1993 claimed 50 lives and inflicted more than 
$12 billion in losses.  Hurricane Andrew claimed 13 
lives and inflicted nearly $25 billion in losses (p. 7). 
The Congressional report (Dec. 14, 1994) also found that federal 
disaster assistance lacked means to encourage individuals, 
communities, and state governments to take precautionary actions 
prior to disasters (p.  1). 
Federal  Mitigation  Initiatives  (1990s) 
During the early 1990s, FEMA focused on two areas of policy to 
reduce costs: mitigation initiatives and insurance reform.  One 
example of federal hazard mitigation legislation is the National 
Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP) (1990), which 
amended the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act (1977) (Palm, 1990: 
102).  This revised legislation assigned FEMA as the lead federal 
agency to coordinate earthquake hazards reduction activities among 
three federal agencies: the U.S. prediction and seismic zone 
assessments undertaken by the Geological Survey, basic research 
sponsored by the National Science Foundation, building standards 
development activities by National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (May and Williams, 1986: p. 94; NEHRP Report to 
Congress, 1991-92: vi).  NEHRP "more clearly defined efforts to 
implement a full-scale and aggressive program of earthquake 
hazards reduction" (p. vi).  NEHRP's objectives are sixfold: 38 
1. Increase availability of information; 
2. Target outreach and implementation efforts; 
3. Transfer technology; 
4. Enhance mitigation; 
5. Conduct problem-focused geological research; and 
6. Encourage community adoption of adequate 
building codes (NEHRP Report to Congress, 1991­
1992: vi). 
In addition to coordinating these federal agencies, FEMA also seeks 
state participation in NEHRP.  In 1991, Oregon joined NEHRP with the 
passage of State Senate Bill 96.  This statute (1) established the 
Oregon Seismic Safety Policy Advisory Commission; (2) required all 
new building sites for high occupancy facilities to be evaluated for 
vulnerability for seismic hazards; (3) and mandated that earthquake 
drills and thirty minutes of instruction on earthquake safety be 
conducted in schools each month (NEHRP Report to Congress, 1991­
92: 61). 
In addition to hazard mitigation, FEMA is also trying to reduce 
costs, in part, through insurance reform.  Insurance is referred to as 
a redistributive method for disaster losses where the 
occupant who inhabits a hazardous zone joins forces 
with a large financial organization to spread the risk 
in a collective manner... It occurs commercially when 
an individual perceives a hazard and purchases a 
policy from a company which guarantees that any 
specified losses will be reimbursed (Smith, 1992: 76). 
In effect, a policyholder may spread the cash burden from one major 
disaster over a number of years through the payment of an annual 39 
premium (ibid.).  Clary (1985) indicated, "In contrast to grants and 
loans, insurance tends to produce lower income differentials among 
victims and between them and society" (p. 25).  However, all-hazard 
insurance is currently not available in many areas of the U.S. that are 
at high risk of disasters.  As a result, property owners have become 
dependent on government loans and grants when their property is 
destroyed by a disaster.  Following the Mississippi Floods of 1993, 
the House of Representatives Task Force Report on Dec. 14, 1994, 
recently recommended the creation of a private, nationally-based 
all-hazard insurance program, in partnership with the insurance 
industry (p.  9).  Individuals and insurance companies would then 
share the costs and responsibilities so the total burden would not fall 
on the federal government. 
Mitigation and preparedness activities have been hindered for 
numerous reasons other than insurance: lack of legislative and public 
support, turf battles with inter- and intra- governmental agencies, 
and restrictions on how state and local agencies can spend federal 
funds (May and Williams, 1986: 148).  Unfortunately, the "action­
forcing" agent needed to reduce these obstacles is often a catastrophe 
itself (May and Williams, 1986: 143). 
Summary 
This chapter has looked at the development of emergency 
management policies, and the institutions that are responsible for 
implementation of these policies.  Disaster legislation in the United 
States has followed a pattern of intermittent, incremental, and 
reactive interest with subsequent political "quick fix" responses.  The 40 
role of the federal government in disaster policies can be traced back 
to the Disaster Relief Act of 1950.  Since then, the federal 
government has increased its involvement from Civil Defense to 
disaster planning, preparedness, response, and recovery.  Over those 
years, the cost of disasters to federal taxpayers has risen from about 
5 percent of the total costs of disasters in the 1950s, to 90 percent or 
more of total public relief in the 1970s (Clary, 1985: 24).  This is, in 
part, because the federal role has further expanded its role to include 
disaster benefits such as psychological counseling, tax relief, and 
legal advice (ibid.).  Hence, the full cost of disasters to federal 
taxpayers has increased (U.S. House of Representatives, Dec. 14, 
1994: 7). 
There is a federal push for regulation and control of disasters 
to be augmented at the state and local level (Clary, 1985: 25).  This 
process of devolution seeks to reassert the original intent of the 
Disaster Relief Act of 1950: placing the basic responsibility for 
disaster management on the states and their localities.  Notably, 
some states, counties and cities have already pushed through 
disaster mitigation and preparedness legislation and initiatives in 
response to inadequate federal actions. However, one crucial question 
remains unanswered:  How can the federal government persuade 
communities to accept more responsibility for pre-disaster planning 
and preparedness in order to prevent the worst effects and high 
costs of disasters? 
FEMA is re-thinking its relationship with the local emergency 
management agencies (LEMAs).  LEMAs appear to be better prepared 
to handle disasters than 20 years ago (Quarantelli, 1988: 6). 41 
However, they are constrained by federal mandates, such as national 
security directives.  Concomitantly, LEMAs have abdicated much of 
their responsibilities, and turned to the federal level to cover rising 
costs in recent years (FEMA, 1994: 1).  Indeed, FEMA has reached a 
critical juncture.  On the one hand, the federal government wants 
states and local entities to follow standardized plans; on the other 
hand, local entities have a need to create disaster programs that 
reflect community values, accountability, and ownership.  These 
dynamics further complicate the planning process at the local level. 
FEMA has not been consistent with bolstering local interest, 
initiative, support, and commitment.  LEMAs have been suspicious 
and perplexed, in a sense, because while the federal government has 
covered more of the costs, it has created a more troubled than 
productive environment for local disaster planning. 42 
CHAPTER 4
 
DISASTER PLANNING AND RISK
 
As more people and structures crowd into hazardous zones and 
individual decisions confound management of disasters, planners 
grapple with the question: "How can we educate the public to 
understand hazard risks, and thus, make informed decisions for pre-
disaster preparedness?" (Burby and Dalton, 1994: 229; Petak, 1985: 
5).  Planners acknowledge that the public perceives risk differently 
from experts.  They are trying to bridge the gap between people's 
perception of risk and that of experts so that disaster planning is 
more effective. 
Risk  Assessment 
Several researchers have examined risk assessment (Kates, 
1978; Slovic, 1987; Hadden, 1989; Mitchell, 1989; Palm, 1990; Smith, 
1992; Bolstridge, 1992; Burton, Kates and White, 1993).  Risk 
assessment is defined as a formal method for determining the kinds 
and degree of risk posed by any environmental hazard (Mitchell, 
1989: 190-93).  It requires a probability statement of a hazardous 
event and the consequences.  Most often, trained experts perform 
this technical, specialized function.  Smith (1992) indicates that the 
objective of risk assessment "is to produce repeatable results 
applicable at the group level" (p. 58).  Risk assessment is an explicitly 
scientific approach that attempts to exclude all value judgments and 
personal preferences, including those of the expert. 43 
Some argue that hazard management decisions cannot be based 
solely on objective, statistical risk assessments.  Burton, Kates and 
White (1993) write, "An analysis of risk needs to take into account 
how it is perceived by the people directly affected, individuals and 
organizations involved in responding to risk, as well as the 
perceptions of scientific and technical analysts" (p. 248).  Risk means 
different things to different people because each person holds an 
unique view of their environment and of environmental risk (ibid.). 
Differences  in  Risk Perception 
Hadden (1989) writes that risk perception is influenced by 
"attitudes, economic situations and cultural milieus" (p.  142).  Other 
factors that affect hazard perception include: past experiences, 
present attitudes, and future expectations (Smith, 1992: 60). 
Fischhoff et al. (1980) in their report, "How Safe is Safe Enough?," 
claimed that the perception of any risk "is a function of such factors 
as the extent to which the risk is familiar, known, voluntary, 
controllable, and dreaded" (p. 127).  For example, when deciding 
where to store hazardous materials or construct a dam, public 
hearings are held.  In these settings, experts have often concluded 
that the public simply cannot understand risk because they are 
influenced by their interests, values, emotions, and lifestyle choices 
(ibid.).  In turn, the public challenges the technical competence of 
outside experts.  The implications of these differences in risk 
perception could lead to serious complications (Kates, 1970; Palm, 
1990: 16).  Smith (1992) adds: 44 
Some risk analysts regard perceptions as invalid since 
they arise from emotional and other subjective 
influences.  But, to the layperson, perceptions are the 
only relevant view because they incorporate the expert's 
analysis together with the individual judgment based on 
experience, social context, and other factors.  The fact that 
this view is less "scientific" does not render it invalid. 
The real difficulty arises when risk analysts expect their 
conclusions to be accepted simply because they are as 
objective as possible whilst laypeople reject such 
interpretations simply because they ignore individual 
concerns and fears (p. 59). 
"Many people make decisions and take actions regarding 
hazards based on their personal perception of the risk rather than on 
some objectively derived measure of the threat" (Smith, 1992: 46­
47).  Because of this, risk perception also has to be regarded as a 
valid component of risk management parallel to scientific 
assessments.  Distinctions are frequently drawn between objective 
and perceived risks, largely because people perceive risks very 
differently from the predictions made by the more objective 
assessment models. 
The public's perception of risk assessment is often different 
from that of experts.  Slovic (1987) found that experts use technical 
ways of assessing risk, while the public tends to draw conclusions 
about risk intuitively, and the results are different.  For instance, the 
study of Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1980) asked three 
groups to rank thirty activities in order of greatest risk.  They found 
that nuclear power topped the list for non-experts, whereas experts 45 
ranked nuclear power 20th.  The experts chose motor vehicles as the 
highest risk (pp.  181-216). 
Disaster planning is complicated because people sometimes 
underestimate risk, overestimate it,  or simply ignore the risk, 
viewing disasters as inevitable (Burton et al., 1993: 246).  Moreover, 
Hewitt and Burton (1971) assert that people also assess natural and 
technological hazards differently (pp. 146-47).  Planners have 
considered why the public perceived risks differently from the 
experts.  Resolving all the differences between the results of 
technical risk analysis and subjective risk perception is a major 
factor in most hazard management strategies (Smith, 1992: 46-47). 
Implications  for  Disaster  Planning 
Quarantelli (1985) writes that in order for people to get 
involved in disaster preparedness, "There should be a perceived 
possibility that there is a potential danger to themselves, relatives, 
friends, property, or symbolic objects that they value highly" (p. 2). 
Quarantelli (1985) also states that the public will not become actively 
involved in preparedness unless they recognize risks are real, 
directly threatening, highly possible, and could occur within a 
relatively short time span (pp. 2-3).  Similarly, individuals tend to 
act if they see there is something to be gained by pre-disaster 
planning, such as hazard reduction. 
Clearly, there is a need for better communication and ability to 
agree on risk between the experts and the public to improve the 
planning process.  Some suggest that if experts could provide hazard 46 
maps so that the public could clearly see the scientific risks, it could 
narrow the gap between experts and the public's perceptions of risk 
related to various hazards. 
Hazard Mapping 
Hazard maps are one tool to help the public visualize risk. 
Some scholars have suggested people are not interested in pre-
disaster planning because they are not informed about risks in their 
community (Foster, 1980: 45).  The development of detailed hazard 
maps depicting overlapping hazards and degrees of risk by 
geographic area could be central in educating citizens (Foster, 1980; 
Monmonier, 1994).  Foster (1980) wrote that mapping hazard 
information covers several factors: the size of the region, the scale of 
the map, the diversity of hazards being considered, availability of 
information, and the techniques applied (Foster, 1980: 88). Among 
the benefits of preparing risk maps: the public, planners, and others 
are able to locate hazard risks in relation to their home, 
neighborhood, school or workplace (p. 43).  This could increase public 
involvement and generate support for disaster planning. 
When hazard maps are superimposed on externally-referenced 
maps, they show factors other than risk.  They can display 
emergency lifelines, telecommunications, transportation networks, 
gas and water services, and evacuation routes.  Inclusion of 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) applications into the planning 
process could be significant in influencing citizen involvement in pre-
disaster planning (Star and Estes, 1990).  A GIS database would allow 
the storage, manipulation, and display of geographically-referenced 47 
information.  The primary goal would be to identify where 
approximate and estimated risks are located.  However, this can be 
difficult to accomplish for two reasons: 
1. Scientists are unable to predict exactly when, where, 
and how a disaster will strike.  Uncertainty will always 
exist (Burton and Kates, 1964). 
2. Many developers and government agencies have 
resisted hazard mapping because it is considered too 
costly (Foster, 1980). 
Foster (1980) proposes that the benefits of hazard mapping (e.g., the 
saving of lives and prevention of property damage) greatly outweigh 
the costs involved (p. 90).  In the long run, he argues, "It is cheaper 
to plan to avoid the effects of a disaster than to suffer from it" (ibid.). 
It is important to disseminate hazard maps to the public.  For 
instance, Portland Metro Planning Department and the Oregon 
Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI) are among 
the first in Oregon to have cooperatively designed relative 
earthquake hazard maps for the Portland metropolitan area since 
1994.  These maps depict areas which are more or less susceptible to 
liquefaction, land failure, ground motion amplification, dynamic slope 
instability, and structural failure.  Planning has been more focused as 
a result of hazard mapping.  These maps have been used by several 
emergency response agencies, emergency coordinators, land use 
planners, insurance companies, prospective property owners, 
students of natural hazards, and elected officials to help prioritize 48 
probable risk.  However, they have not yet been widely disseminated 
to the public. 
Summary 
This chapter explained previous research on risk assessment, 
differences in risk perceptions, and hazard mapping.  Risk 
assessment is controversial, and adds to the complexity of disaster 
planning.  Understanding the public's perceptions of risk and how it 
differs from scientific assessment has been a key determinant for 
planning.  Studies show that people tend to get involved in pre-
disaster preparedness activities when they perceive hazards are 
directly threatening.  However, it may be difficult for people to be 
proactive because disaster events are uncertain.  Experts 
acknowledge that disaster planning is difficult because it  is 
impossible to predict exactly what physical or social events will take 
place.  Nevertheless, they are working to more accurately assess and 
communicate risk to the public.  One method they have started to 
incorporate is hazard mapping.  Geographic Information Systems can 
be used to inform residents of potential risks in their community. 49 
CHAPTER 5
 
DISASTER PLANNING MODELS
 
Out of the literature review of U.S. disaster planning, two 
distinctively different processes have become evident.  The 
researcher has extracted central themes and patterns, and formalized 
two conceptual disaster planning models.  They will be called the 
Traditional Emergency Management System (TEMS) and Community-
Based Emergency Preparedness (CBEP).  The latter is basically 
greater specification of the planning approach encouraged by FEMA 
Region X.  This section will provide a preliminary layout for 
examining Benton County later in Chapter 6. 
Traditional Emergency Management System (TEMS) 
The current disaster planning approach for local, state, and 
federal levels of government is comprised of four integral parts: 
mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (McLoughlin, 1985: 
166; Clary, 1985: 20; Petak, 1985: 3).  This planning strategy, is 
known as Integrated Emergency Management System, and primarily 
focuses on two phases: response and recovery.  Because IEMS is in 
fact centered at the federal levels and more reliant on government 
experts, it will be referred to as the traditional model. 
The TEMS planning approach has been plagued with intra­
governmental conflicts and weak or non-existent management 
systems (Sylves, 1992: 303) resulting in poor disaster response, lack 
of interagency coordination, as well as public distrust (Petak, 1985: 50 
4-5).  Consequently, the public, planners and experts are seeking 
alternative planning approaches to effectively cope with disasters. 
Community-Based Emergency Preparedness (CBEP) 
As mentioned in the literature review, the federal government 
seeks to devolve responsibility back to LEMAs.  Officials at FEMA 
Region X in Bothell, Washington, are proposing a shift from FEMA 
standardized disaster planning to one which focuses on greater 
governmental flexibility and community involvement.  This is known 
as Community-Based Emergency Preparedness (CBEP).  Community, 
as defined by officials in Bothell, includes "individuals, families, 
friends, neighbors, businesses, volunteer organizations, local 
government, and adjacent communities" (FEMA Region X, 1994:  1). 
In principle, private citizens, volunteer organizations, churches, 
neighborhood associations, and private businesses would work with 
local government agencies to develop pre-disaster planning and 
preparedness strategies.  Furthermore, the government would share 
responsibility for emergency response with these private 
associations.  For instance, community members would be trained to 
assist in performing critical emergency response functions.  CBEP 
assumes better collaboration among all these groups.  The concept of 
"community based" fosters "community-spirit" which is thought to be 
effective in accomplishing results that serve the unique interests of 
the community (ibid.). 
Community involvement in pre-disaster planning would reduce 
the burden already placed on overwhelmed LEMAs or government 
authorities.  Officials at FEMA Region X contend that there are many 51 
resources, skills, expertise and capabilities that already exist within 
and near a community that are not fully utilized in the traditional 
ways of emergency planning.  As a result, if communities used these 
local resources, they could become more self-reliant.  This is 
significantly different from the traditional approach in that local 
government would not have to rely solely on government or on state 
and federal assistance.  Consequently, the CBEP approach would 
improve community relations with local government officials while 
reducing irrecoverable disaster losses (FEMA Region X, 1994: 1). 
Six  Process  Characteristics 
This section will briefly describe each model in terms of six 
aspects: organizational structure, problem identification, leadership 
approach, citizen participation, role of experts, and outcome. 
Organizational Structure 
The organizational structure of the TEMS model is described as 
a hierarchically-arranged staff that operates amidst pre-set 
procedures and rules in order to closely regulate activities (Dynes, 
1970: 21).  Authority is centralized, which means power is focused at 
the national level instead of in state or local governments" (Scott and 
Garrison, 1995: 284).  The "top-down" approach is considered elitist 
because few are involved in decision making. 
Emergency management agencies at various levels of 
government prepare, plan, and respond to disasters within a complex 
and bureaucratic environment.  This resembles Weber's (1947) 
classic bureaucratic model: hierarchy of authority, limited authority, 52 
division of labor, technically competent participants, procedures for 
work, professionalism, rules for incumbents, and differential rewards 
(Schuman and Olufs, 1993: 99-102).  One example of centralized, 
bureaucratic organizational structure is visible when FEMA requires 
written damage assessments before it will disburse any relief 
refunds (Schneider, 1992: 136).  FEMA maintains this is necessary 
monitoring functions while LEMAs complain the "red tape" is 
excessive and demanding. 
The TEMS approach has a formal structure, which is apparent 
by written rules, regulations, procedures, instructions and 
communications (Pugh, Hickson, Hinings and Turner, 1968: 75).  State 
and federal laws identify the roles and responsibilities of the local 
level, as well as of the state and national levels.  For example, if the 
scope of a disaster exceeds the capacities of lower governmental 
units, they must formally request additional assistance from the next 
higher level in writing (Schneider, 1992: 136). 
This hierarchical arrangement is found in most disaster 
planning.  Local officials are required by state and federal laws to 
produce manuals of operating procedures.  However, information in 
these emergency plans are often not continuously updated nor easily 
found, they are largely unused.  Moreover, local administrators are 
expected to complete their tasks by following specific rules, and 
guidelines from OEM and FEMA (Schneider, 1994; Clary, 1985). 
The organizational structure of the CBEP model is more 
informal than the TEMS model.  For instance, with CBEP, the public is 
included in planning meetings and public seminars.  The public has 
more informal access to decision makers and emergency response 53 
officials.  Furthermore, coordination and collaboration are 
emphasized, and information is presented and shared with more 
people through various community networks.  Hence, communities 
use networking to accomplish disaster planning objectives. 
Problem Identification 
In the past, emergency problems and the goals for planning 
were identified by FEMA.  For instance, FEMA required local 
governments to concentrate on civil defense at a time when more 
immediate and serious natural hazards threatened communities.  The 
federal government standardized disaster planning objectives in an 
attempt to provide some level of quality.  For example, federal 
policies stressed civil defense planning when they were not 
appropriate policies for local conditions. 
In contrast, problems are identified locally in the CBEP 
approach.  The CBEP model allows the community to work towards 
three basic objectives: 
1. Local citizens decide what the programs should be. 
2. Local citizens establish work plans and define specific 
tasks to be done and the expected end products. 
3. Local citizens decide who is responsible for the 
accomplishment and maintenance of each task (FEMA 
Region X, 1994). 
Community values are considered when defining problems.  This 
assumes that local problems are more true indicators of community 
need.  In essence, the main difference between problem 54 
identification in the TEMS and CBEP planning approaches is that the
 
latter emphasizes discretionary authority at the local level, whereas 
the former stresses higher levels of centralization. 
Leadership Approach 
Leadership styles influence both behavior and attitudes in any 
given community.  Etzioni (1965) defines leadership as "the ability, 
based on the personal qualities of the leader, to elicit the followers' 
voluntary compliance in a broad range of matters" (p. 3).  In the past, 
emergency planners were recruited, trained and rewarded for 
"taking control" of disaster situations (Dynes, 1990).  Typically they 
did not include others in disaster planning or in directing emergency 
response because it was faster, easier, and less threatening to do it 
alone. 
The CBEP model calls for more "participative leadership."  Filley 
and House (1969) describes three general classifications of 
participative  leadership: 
1. Consideration for others.	  The leader considers the needs 
and preferences of others, whom (s)he treats with dignity 
and kindness, and is not punitive in his/her dealings with 
them.  Such a leader is frequently referred to as "employee­
centered" as opposed to "work-centered" or "task-centered." 
2. Consultative Decision Making.	  The leader asks his/her 
others for their opinion before making decisions.  Such a 
leader is consultative, participative, or democratic (as 
opposed to unilateral, autocratic, or arbitrary) in his/her 
decision making. 
3. General supervision. The leader supervises in a general 
rather than a close manner, delegates authority to others, 
and permits them freedom to exercise discretion in their 55 
work rather than imposing tight controls and close 
(frequently overbearing) supervision.  (pp.  399-400). 
Researchers note "better decisions and better results" as one 
benefit to participative leadership.  For instance, the CBEP approach 
is considered more democratic than the TEMS approach.  Clearly, 
citizens may become more involved in pre-disaster planning if the 
leadership approach is more facilitative than directive. 
Citizen Involvement 
How citizens are involved also influences pre-disaster planning. 
In the past, officials followed the 1950s-Civil Defense military model 
of "command and control" (Dynes, 1990: 2).  Officials assumed they 
needed to direct helpless, irrational, and panic-stricken individuals. 
This model assumed that a return to "normalcy" would only be 
possible if there was a centrally-directed command over the chaos, 
and to "regain control" over the disorganization of individuals (Dynes, 
1990: 5-6).  Over time, this resulted in high expectations in 
communities for government "to bail them out" during disasters 
(White, 1961; Hewitt and Burton, 1971).  However, government has 
not always been able to match the public's expectations. 
In contrast, the CBEP model views people as a resource.  As 
mentioned previously, this approach views the government official's 
role as facilitating rather than dominating the disaster planning 
process.  Local agency officials share responsibility during disasters 
rather than claiming sole responsibility.  Another aspect of the CBEP 
model is planners and emergency personnel have direct interaction 56 
with interested citizens in the context of developing, reviewing, and 
adopting plans and proposals (Alexander, 1986: 105).  Ideally, 
individuals, groups, interests, organizations, and community leaders 
would be involved to influence the outcome of disaster planning. 
The TEMS model assumes the public is apathetic during "non­
disaster" times.  Alexander (1986) noted that "it usually takes the 
perception of a crisis directly affecting citizens' daily lives  ...  to 
mobilize people to invest the time, effort, and organization that will 
enable them to affect and change public decisions" (p. 107).  In the 
CBEP model, it is important for citizens, planning officials, elected 
officials, and others to clearly understand, support and act towards 
achieving planning objectives to cope with disasters. 
Role of Experts 
The role of scientific experts in disaster planning is also 
important.  In the past, scientific knowledge has been key to 
preventing and managing disasters.  Experts appeared to have all the 
knowledge, and risk assessment was based on science.  What 
knowledge the public possessed (be it irrational or limited) was 
based on their perceptions of hazard risks.  Policy makers, in turn, 
based their decisions upon expertise, and neglected citizens' 
viewpoints.  The TEMS model constituted a technological remedy for 
sustaining social order during times of natural and technological 
crises.  Consequently, disaster bureaucracies have been organized to 
carry out scientific and statistical research methods on mitigation 
and damage prevention (Hewitt, 1983). 57 
In contrast, in the CBEP approach, risk assessment is influenced 
by community values.  Experts work together, rather than separately 
in the CBEP model.  Moreover, experts' research is used by the public 
where and when appropriate.  For example, experts provide 
information about general hazard location, severity, and probabilities 
in an understandable form.  They might also translate highly 
technical variables into layperson's language in order for the public 
to participate in decision making.  Experts have three specific roles 
for disaster planning: 
1. Identify potentially significant hazards in the 
community. 
2. Make an assessment of people and/or property at risk 
due to specific hazards by defining the impacted 
geographic areas. 
3. Analyze the vulnerability of the at-risk people and 
property from the perspective of probable 
consequences if nothing is done to effectively respond 
to the emergency (FEMA Region X 1994 Handout; 
Participant Observation, Nov. 17, 1994). 
With the CBEP approach, experts take community values into 
account when trying to communicate risks to the public. 
Consequently, citizens would better comprehend hazards that most 
likely threaten their home or workplace.  Subsequently, citizens 
would be motivated to get involved in pre-disaster planning or other 
mitigation  strategies. 58 
Outcome 
The outcome of TEMS and CBEP approaches differ.  In the 
former approach, FEMA is product-oriented in that it requires 
Standard Operating Plans (SOPs), and a written plan.  Kartez and 
Lindell (1987) note: "Disaster plans, by virtue of both convention and 
the guidelines that state and federal funding agencies have imposed, 
have been lengthy and dry procedural documents descended from 
military command models" (p. 488).  These scholars also state, 
Plans perform two necessary functions:  first, the 
production of the plan satisfies state and federal 
requirements for funding local disaster preparedness. 
Secondly, a written plan documents the allocation of 
emergency responsibilities and defines the legal 
authority under which communities can take emergency 
actions (Kartez and Lindell, 1987: 488-89). 
However, the fact that a plan has assigned specific responsibilities 
does not necessarily imply that those who have been assigned the 
responsibilities are aware, accept, or are capable of performing their 
role (Kartez and Lindell, 1987: 495). 
In contrast, the CBEP approach focuses on planning as a 
process.  Research has shown that those emergency organizations 
that have gone through the planning process have been more 
effective in helping prevent, neutralize, weaken or mitigate the 
impact of disaster (Quarantelli, 1985: 5).  Planning as a process 
entails implementing programs and activities such as mitigation, 
preparedness, public education, and training to build networks that 
work.  The CBEP approach emphasizes long-term commitment with 59 
the expectation that the plan is developmental.  In essence, the 
planning process is continuously being reworked and revised by 
community members and government officials, and lives in their 
awareness of their respective roles. 
Summary 
This theoretical overview reveals differences between a 
traditional emergency management model and a community-based 
one.  Table 6 summarizes both models according to the six process 
characteristics.  These conceptual tools and idealized models provide 
a framework for viewing the development of disaster planning in 
Benton County. 60 
Table 6: Comparing Disaster Planning Models TEMS with CBEP with
 
Six Process Characteristics
 
Process 
Characteristics
 
Organizational

Structure 
Problem 
Definition 
Leadership
Approach
 
Citizen
 
Involvement 
Role  of  experts 
Outcome 
Traditional
 
Emergency
 
Management  System
 
(TEMS) 
Hierarchical 
Formal 
Mandates 
Rules and Regulations 
Duplicated  functions 
Rational 
Uniform problems 
identified by FEMA 
and Oregon 
Emergency 
Management 
Top-down 
Directive 
Tight Control 
Reactive 
Officials  direct 
public  activity 
during  disasters 
Passive 
High expectations of 
government 
Experts  are  central 
People have minimal 
role 
Decisions made by 
policy  makers 
Risk assessment 
based on science 
Focus on reliance on 
technology 
Little  collaboration 
among experts 
Product-oriented 
(A Plan) 
"Quick-fix" 
Community-Based  Benton 
Emergency  County 
Preparedness 
(CBEP) 
Networking  9 Informal 
Discretionary  Behavior 
Shared Governance 
Flexible 
Decentralized 
Local problems are  9
indicators  of 
community needs 
Community values 
considered 
Bottom-up  9 Facilitative 
Preventive 
Proactive 
Officials and others  9
share  responsibility 
during  disasters 
Build  coalitions 
People take 
responsibility  for 
themselves 
People see the benefits 
Stakeholders 
Experts  translate  9 risks to public so they 
can understand and 
make decisions 
Risk assessment 
influenced by 
community values 
Experts work together 
Process-oriented  9
(Community 
Development) 
Long-term commitment 
Continuous 
improvement 61 
CHAPTER 6 
CASE STUDY OF DISASTER PLANNING IN BENTON CO. 
Introduction 
Located in the heart of the Willamette Valley, Benton County 
was established in 1847 as the seventh county in territorial  Oregon 
(Benton County Community Relations, 1994).  It is the third smallest 
county in Oregon at about 677 square miles, and ranks ninth out of 
36 counties in terms of population (Oregon Blue Book, 1993-94, 
p. 303).  Table 7 shows the population increase among selected 
Benton County cities from 1960-1992. 
Table 7: Population figures for Benton County, its Cities, and the State 
of Oregon (1960-1992) 
Area  1970  1980  90,  1992 
Cory Ills
hiloi 
20,669 
1,359 
35,056 
1,688 
40,960 
2,673 
44,757 
2,983 
45,470 
3,045 
Adair  Village 
roe 
N/A 
374 
N/A 
443 
589 
412 
554 
448 
570 
480 
Co.  39,165  53,776  68,211  70,811  72,900 
Oregon  1,768,687  2,091,533  2,633,156  2,842,321  2,797,000 
Source: Oregon Blue Book, 1993-94, pp. 297-301. 
Since 1960 Oregon has experienced a 58 percent increase in 
population, while Benton County has had an 86 percent increase. 
Corvallis has experienced a 119 percent increase in population 
during the last 32 years.  Benton County's largest city, Corvallis is 
home to Oregon State University, as well as to many research and 
development, manufacturing, and agricultural industries.  As the 62 
population and economy of the Pacific Northwest continues to grow, 
more people are moving into areas that are vulnerable to hazards 
such as flooding, severe weather, wildland fires, hazardous materials 
spills, and earthquakes.  Hence, the population growth of Benton 
County is a signal that the community needs to pay attention to 
emergency planning and mitigation strategies. 
Background to  Planning 
Until 1989, disaster planning in Benton County was done by 
one individual, the emergency services coordinator.  Like other 
county planners, he was trained in civil defense.  Other than the 
coordinator, few knew what the plan contained.  Planning was mostly 
a paper exercise wherein only one person understood what would 
happen during a disaster. 
This situation changed in 1989 when a Benton County citizen, 
the Key Informant of this case study, determined to make disaster 
planning a higher priority in Benton County.  Her interest in 
emergency management was triggered by news of the Loma Prieta 
earthquake (7.1 on the Richter scale), which violently shook the San 
Francisco Bay Area on Oct. 17, 1989.  She began to investigate the 
level of disaster preparedness in Benton County.  In a 1994 
interview, she said: 
I've lived here long enough to know that stuff happens in 
this valley, and we're not really immune.  So I wonder 
how prepared are we for disasters?  I have this idea. 
What would happen if we called all emergency response 
personnel together in the community?  Somebody from 
the fire department, police department, city and county 
public works, hospital, university, school district, and all 63 
these people who need to know what to do if we had an 
emergency and talked about how prepared we are (Key 
Informant interview, July 8,  1994). 
So she presented her idea to the mayor and county commissioners. 
They supported her proposal to schedule a meeting with community 
leaders (e.g., Red Cross, OSU, private businesses, public safety, utility 
companies, emergency services coordinator, public works, civic and 
service organizations) to discuss emergency preparedness and 
response capability. 
During these inquiries, a Corvallis fire official suggested that 
the Key Informant get in touch with FEMA.  The Key Informant 
described her initial contact with FEMA: 
They (Corvallis fire officials) told me what it (FEMA) was, and 
gave me the number up in Seattle area ....  I called them and 
told who I was and what I was doing  ....  They were really 
captivated to think that this homemaker was interested in 
doing this.  So they said they had some literature they could 
send down and maybe even somebody from there would come 
to this meeting. 
Then an hour later I got a phone call from FEMA in 
Washington, D.C. The guy said, 'We're having a family 
protection and self-help conference next week (at the National 
Emergency Training Center, Emergency Management Institute 
in Emmitsburg, Maryland).  Would you like to come back here 
and take part in this?'  And I said, 'I'd really like to, but I can't 
afford to do that.'  And he said, 'The taxpayers will pay for 
your ticket.  You just have to pay for your food when you get 
back here, and the government owns an university campus 
where we'll house you in dorms.'  So I said, 'I'm coming.' 
They were so excited about what I was doing that FEMA 
said they would send out a P.R. firm to video this forum (Key 
Informant interview, July  8,  1994) 64 
In March of 1990, the Key Informant organized a meeting 
which was attended by community leaders, such as the Red Cross 
director, OSU safety officer, amateur radio associations, private 
businesses, fire and police department officials, utility companies, 
emergency services coordinator, public works, civic and service 
organizations, as well as FEMA Region X officials.  An Eugene-based 
public relations firm filmed a segment of the meeting for a FEMA 
disaster preparedness video entitled "When Disaster Strikes" (1990). 
(See Appendix E for transcript of video).  During the two-hour 
meeting, the participants shared information and ideas about 
emergency preparedness.  They concluded that local families "need 
more information on how to prepare for disasters, and survive on 
their own" (video transcript).  They decided it would take the active 
involvement of concerned citizens like the Key Informant to get a 
community awareness program up and running (video transcript). 
The participants decided to create a community-wide task force on 
citizen  preparedness. 
The Key Informant called the second meeting in November, 
1990.  She described the purpose of the meeting: 
I wanted to show the government people, emergency 
response (agencies) and city and county government, that 
it was their responsibility, and that there's a greater 
danger than what they really think there is (interview, 
July 8, 1994). 65 
In the following months, the Key Informant tried to gather 
support from the Sheriff and emergency personnel leaders.  She 
regularly arranged appointments with Benton County officials who 
were legally responsible for emergency management.  They 
recognized that her commitment was serious.  She said: 
I started it in January of 1991.  I would go to the fire 
chief, to the sheriff, and to the fire chief.  And the next 
week I'd go to the sheriff to the fire chief to the sheriff. 
And I did that for weeks.  Finally the sheriff said, 
`You keep showing up on my schedule, on my 
agenda for the day.  Would you please tell me what 
you want so that we can do it, so you'll quit just 
coming in here. I guess the bottom line is as far as 
emergency management was concerned I  didn't 
figure it was a squeaky wheel but you've been 
squeaking in my ear so long.  Tell me how to grease 
it so you'll quit doing this.' 
So I said I want the council organized.  I want it to be a 
legitimate council under the direction of the county 
commissioners, and you need to be recognized as the 
head of it because emergency management is your 
responsibility, and we need to have people meet on a 
regular basis so that we can talk (Key Informant 
interview, July 8,  1994). 
The Sheriff said he supported emergency preparedness and the 
Key Informant's ideas because she was committed.  In April 1991, 
the Benton County Emergency Management Council was formed.  The 
Sheriff appointed the Key Informant as chairperson of the Council. 
She has remained chairperson for the past four years. 
Representatives who served on that Council include emergency 
services personnel, Red Cross, Benton County Extension, OSU safety 66 
officer, amateur radio associations, private businesses, fire 
department and law enforcement officials, public works, utility 
companies, elected officials, churches, school district officials, 
newspaper editor, civic and service organizations. 
The Council was formed to discuss emergency management 
issues and to coordinate emergency response capabilities.  However, 
while the Council legitimized grass-roots efforts, a major component 
was missing: an effective Emergency Services Coordinator who could 
empower and guide Benton County public, private, and volunteer 
groups to share responsibilities for disaster planning. 
The second major development in disaster planning in Benton 
County occurred when a new Emergency Services Coordinator was 
hired in 1992.  One of his first objectives was to re-write the 
Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) because the current plans were 
outdated and based on FEMA-mandated civil defense objectives.  An 
EOP is a document that contains information on actions that local 
officials, disaster relief organizations, emergency personnel, and 
others take to protect people and property before, during, and 
following a disaster.  It describes tasks that are carried out by 
specified organizational entities.  These emergency tasks are typical 
to most disaster situations whether natural or technological hazards. 
The Emergency Services Coordinator described that this was not the 
case with Benton County's current EOP: 
The present plan is basically a civil defense plan from the 
'50s that in the early '80s was rewritten to be an all-
hazards plan.  The reality is, they took a 1950s defense 
plan, and they put it in a new dress.  It really is not an 67 
all-hazards plan that I would be very comfortable with 
managing after an earthquake or major flood. It's 
designed for people in the shelters when the bomb goes 
off.  So, we are in the process right now of rewriting the 
county's emergency plan and curriculum to make it a 
really no fooling, all-hazards plan (Emergency Services 
Coordinator interview, July 7,  1994). 
How did Benton County go about re-writing their EOP?  This 
case study, which began in April, 1994 after the above changes 
occurred, traces disaster planning activities that have taken place in 
Benton County during the last twelve months.  However, because the 
process is still emerging and thus changing, the results of this case 
study are limited to the formation and early stages of an on-going 
planning process. 
Steps  in  the Disaster Planning Process 
By law, counties in Oregon are mandated to plan for disasters 
(Oregon Revised Statutes, 401 Series, 1993).  Chapter 401, Oregon 
Revised Statutes (ORS 401.35) describes the authority of a county's 
emergency management agency: 
Each county of this state shall, and each city may, 
establish an emergency management agency which shall 
be directly responsible to the executive officer or 
governing body of the county or city.... Each emergency 
management agency shall perform emergency program 
management functions within the territorial limits of the 
county or city and may perform such functions outside 
the territorial limits as required under any mutual aid 
agreement or as authorized by the county or city (ORS 
401.305; Draft copy Emergency Management Plan for 
Benton County, Oct. 1, 1994: iii). 68 
Prior to starting the EOP revision, the new Emergency Services 
Coordinator completed two pre-planning tasks.  First, he used several 
resources to learn about how to re-write Benton County's Emergency 
Operations Plan (EOP).  For example, Oregon Emergency 
Management's Population Protection Planner assisted Benton County 
with formulating its EOP.  Additionally, FEMA's Civil Preparedness 
Guide 1-8 (1990) and FEMA's Professional Development Series (PDS) 
class entitled, "Emergency Planning Course" provided the technical 
framework for planning, and recommended a multi-hazard, 
functional approach for developing EOP's.  While attending an OEM 
training course in 1993, the new Emergency Services Coordinator 
found a new planning approach that he thought would be 
appropriate for revising Benton County's emergency plan.  He said: 
I learned about a different approach in disaster planning 
known as Community-Based Emergency Management in 
the Fall of 1993.  This approach seemed consistent with 
what Benton County needed because it increased disaster 
preparedness with public awareness.  Community-based 
planning was not the responsibility of one person; instead 
many people would participate on various committees.  I 
borrowed ideas from other sites, such as the Tennessee 
Emergency Management Agency and Yakima 
(Washington) Emergency Services.  So there were 
available models to review, revise and use to meet 
Benton County's needs (July 7, 1994). 
The second task the Emergency Services Coordinator completed 
was getting elected officials to support his efforts.  He presented the 
county commissioners with two planning options: 69 
I can go downstairs in my office and write you an 
emergency plan, and I'll do that if you want.  That can 
happen relatively quickly.  It depends on whether or not 
we want to coordinate this thing with all the other county 
agencies and get some people to put their ink on a 
coordination sheet that says, 'Yes, I can do those kinds of 
things.'  To begin with, I don't know what the capabilities 
of all these agencies are.  It will take much longer to get a 
coordinated copy that we can all agree upon.  But it will 
be my plan.  It will live on the shelf down here.  I'll be 
the only one that knows what's in it... and it will be 
significantly less viable than it would be if we get a lot of 
input and participation.  Or we can take another 
approach, and that is what we'll do.  It is what I call 
community-based planning. (Emergency Services 
Coordinator interview, July 7,  1994). 
Subsequently, with the county commissioners' endorsement of 
the community-based approach, the Emergency Services Coordinator 
was able to get county department heads and agency personnel 
begin working towards this new approach.  He drafted a letter for 
the chair of the board of commissioners for Benton County to send to 
all the elected officials and department heads.  It read: 
The county is about to embark on a two-year project to 
totally rewrite the Benton County Emergency Operations Plan. 
The current plan is seriously outdated and does not adequately 
address several hazards that threaten the citizens of the county 
(earthquakes, wildland fires, and civil disorder). 
This planning effort will begin with a thorough analysis 
of the hazards that could potentially affect the Benton County 
area.  The hazard analysis will serve as a compass to guide us 
in developing mitigation and preparedness strategies to 
counter the threat of the identified hazards.  An ad hoc group 
working with the Emergency Coordinator, developed this 
analysis.  The next step in the process will be to write the basic 70 
operations plan and the supporting annexes that describe how 
we will respond to disaster events.  All existing plans (city, 
county, OSU and industry) should be reviewed and rewritten as 
necessary by the committees to ensure that all plans are 
current and fully coordinated. 
This project will require a cooperative effort from a 
broad cross-section of the community and active involvement 
on the part of all county departments.  Representatives from 
city government, state and federal agencies, business, and 
citizen groups are also being asked to participate.  I solicit your 
support for this project by asking you to identify an individual 
to serve as your jurisdiction's principal representative to the 
planning committee.  This group will supervise the project and 
select the annex chiefs and committee members who will 
actually draft the new emergency operations plan.  Please have 
a representative contact (the Emergency Services 
Coordinator).... 
We hope to begin the project in early January (1994) and 
we have scheduled an informational meeting for principal 
representatives  ....  The purpose of the meeting is to review the 
project schedule and discuss organizational details. 
I am confident that collectively we can develop a 
comprehensive emergency operations plan that will provide 
the direction and guidance necessary to allow the county and 
its communities to respond effectively to any emergency 
situation.  Thank you for your support of this significant project 
(Letter signed by chair of board of commissioners, dated Dec. 
13,  1993) 
After he accomplished these two tasks, he began the 
formulation of Benton County's EOP.  The following steps illustrate 
the process of planning in Benton County and examine general 
activities that took place: 71 
Step 1: Assessing the Hazards 
As mentioned in the county commissioner's letter above, the 
planning process began with reviewing and updating previous 
Benton County hazard analyses.  The Emergency Services Coordinator 
updated the hazard analysis with information from local fire officials, 
the sheriff, and other emergency personnel experts.  He primarily 
used FEMA's Hazard Analysis Matrix to assess hazard risks, and as a 
tool to rank the probability of a hazard occurring in Benton County. 
FEMA's standard matrix is based on four categories: prior history, 
vulnerability, maximum threat, and probability.  The following 
categories are used to determine the severity or risk factor for each 
hazard, such as flooding, fire, or severe weather: 
Severity  ratings 
Low  1  point 
Medium  =  5  points 
High  10 points 
History 
Low  =  0-1  event per 100 years 
Medium  =  2-3  events per 100 years 
High  = 4 +  events per 100 years 
Vulnerability 
Low  = <  1% affected 
Medium  1-10% affected 
High  = >  10% affected 
Maximum Threat 
Low  < 5% affected 
Medium  5-10% affected 
High  > 25% affected 
Probability 
Low  = 1 chance  per 100 years 
Medium  = 1 chance  per  50  years 
High  = 1 chance  per  10  years 72 
By multiplying the "severity rating" by the factors associated 
with the categories above, one can arrive at a subscore for each 
hazard.  Adding the subscore' produces a total score for that hazard. 
The total score is not as important as how it compares with the total 
scores for other hazards that Benton County faces.  It is not intended 
to predict the occurrence of a particular hazard, but rather to 
"quantify" the risk of one hazard compared with another. 
By comparing scores, Benton County can determine hazard 
priorities, or relative risk (OEM, Sample Emergency Operations Plan, 
April 28, 1994; Participant Observation, May 18, 1994).  The 
Emergency Services Coordinator follows an all-hazard approach, and 
anticipates any type or size of hazard.  The current hazards analysis 
(1994) shows that Benton County is vulnerable to several natural 
and human-induced disasters.  Table 8 shows twelve hazards that 
are currently being considered during the planning process. 
Part of the hazards identification includes preparing or 
updating of maps, charts, and any other graphics that may be useful 
to assessing people's vulnerability to hazards.  The researcher 
assisted with the development of some hazard maps with other 
Benton County Public Works engineers.  This section will provide 
some maps, in addition to briefly describing twelve identified 
hazards that could take place in the future in Benton County. 73 
Table 8: Benton County Hazard Analysis Matrix (1994)
 
Hazard  History  Vulner- Max.  Prob- Totals 
x 2  ability  x  x 10  ability = 
5  x7 
Severe  10 x 2  10 x 5  10 x 10  10 x 7  =240 
Weather  =20  =50  =100  =70 
Hazardous  10 x 2  5 x 5  10 x 10  10 x 7  =215 
Materials  =20  =25  =100  =70 
Spillage 
Earthquake  5 x 2  10 x 5  10 x 10  5 x 7  =195 
=10  =50  =100  =35 
Fire/Wildland  10 x 2  5 x 5  5 x 10  10 x 7  =165 
fire  =20  =25  =50  =70 
Flood  10 x 2  5 x 5  5 x 10  10 x 7  =165 
=20  =25  =50  =70
 
Utility  Failure  1 x2  5 x 5  10 x 10  5 x 7  =162
 
=2  =25  =100  =35
 
Enemy Attack  1 x 2  5 x 5  10 x 10  1 x 7  =134
 
=2  =25  =100  =7
 
Drought  5 x 2  1 x 5  5 x 10  5 x 7  =100
 
=10  =5  =50  =35
 
Civil Disorder  5 x 2  5 x 5  5 x 10  1 x 7  =92
 
=10  =25  =50  =7 
Volcanic Ash  1 x 2  1 x 5  5 x 10  5 x 7  =92 
Fallout  =2  =5  =50  =35 
Dam Failure  1 x 2  5 x 5  5 x 10  1 x 7  =84 
=2  =25  =50  =7
 
Radiological  1 x 2  1 x 5  5 x 10  1 x 7  =64
 
Incident  =2  =5  =50  =7
 
Source: Benton County Emergency Services,  June,  1, 1994 
1.  Severe Weather 
Each year, severe winter storms, violent wind, and other severe 
atmospheric disturbances, such as heavy rain, snow or ice.  Severe 
weather may result in loss of life, property damage, crop damage, 
damage to homes and businesses, or power failure in Benton County 
(Palm, 1990: 4; Benton County Hazard Analysis, 1994: 5). 
Throughout history, Benton County has experienced extreme weather 
conditions, including ice storms, blizzards, heavy snowfall, freezing 74 
rain, and high winds (ibid.).  Most notably, the Columbus Day Storm
 
in 1962 caused serious damage throughout the entire Willamette 
Valley (Statesman Journal, Oct. 17, 1962).  Many were left without 
electricity, trees blocked major transportation routes, and several 
people were injured. 
Benton County Public Works anticipates all types of weather 
conditions to maintain vital lifelines in Benton County.  They have 
adopted a "Snow and Ice Priority Plan" (See Plate 1).  For example, 
during the snow storm in February 1995, Benton County Public 
Works first sanded roads shown in red.  In addition, many schools 
and businesses have pre-established procedures in the event of 
severe  weather. 
2. Hazardous Materials Spillage 
In Benton County, a hazardous materials accident could take 
place in an existing public or private fixed facility, or portable 
structure, such as a railway or highway, resulting in serious, long-
term contamination which may irreversibly alter the environment. 
Hadden (1989) presented several factors that result in various levels 
of danger by hazardous materials: exposure, length, route, amount, 
and toxic or hazardous characteristics (p. 6).  For instance, hazardous 
effects may be short-term, or acute, and long-term, or delayed. 
Among short-term hazards are explositivity and flammability.  In 
contrast, long-term or delayed hazards are more difficult to identify 
because their effects are delayed (Hadden, 1989, pp. 6-7). 
According to the Oregon Environmental Atlas (1988), "In the 
past, business and government disposed of hazardous materials in 75 
ways we now know were inadequate to fully protect  public health, 
safety, and the environment" (p. 34).  As a result, Congress passed 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act, also known as "Superfund" in 1980 (ibid.).  Under the 
Superfund program, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has 
established a priority list of sites that need remedial action (pp. 34­
35).  Oregon has five Superfund sites, including one in Corvallis at the 
former United Chrome site (ibid.).  There are several locations where 
hazardous materials are manufactured, used, and/or stored in Benton 
County.  Specific sites have been identified in Table 9 as high risk 
because significant 
Table 9: Location and Type of Hazardous Materials in Corvallis 
Location  Type  of  chemical
 
Oregon State University (Gilbert Hall, Cord ley  Chlorine; Toxic
 
Hall, Weniger Hall, Physical Plant, Nash Hall,  chemicals;  Biohazards
 
Animal Lab, Langton, & Women's Building)
 
Benton Co. Sewage Treatment Plant  Chlorine
 
Hewlett-Packard  Toxic gases, Flammable
 
materials,  Corrosives 
Evanite Fiber Corp.  Toxic gases; propane 
Benton Co. Public Works  Flammable  materials 
Western Pulp Products  Toxic chemicals 
Taylor Water Treatment Plant  Chlorine 
Osborn Aquatic Center  Chlorine 
Oberson's Oil Inc.  Flammable  liquid 
Middleton  Heating  Flammable gas 
Farrell Gas  Bulk  propane 
Bertea/Aviation  Inc.  Flammable gas 
Corvallis High School  Chlorine 
Highway Vision  Above ground fuel tanks 
McNesby & Aubry  Above ground fuel  tanks 
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.  Chlorine 
Antivirals  Inc.  Chloroform;  Biohazards 
Source: Oregon State Fire Marshal's Handbook on Hazardous 
Materials,  1993 76 
quantities of chemicals are stored there. (See Plate 2). 
Large quantities of hazardous materials (gasoline and liquid 
natural gas) move by truck or by rail through Benton County.  Many 
trucks carry hazardous materials on highways 20, 34, and 99 West 
each day (See Plate 2).  According to an Oregon Public Utility 
Commissioner official, only 36 accidents involving trucks carrying 
hazardous materials occurred in 1994, out of about 1,300 trucking 
accidents statewide (Oregonian, Jan. 26, 1995, Cl, C5). 
3.  Earthquakes 
According to a seismologist/geologist at FEMA Region X, a 
recent seismic risk map for the state of Oregon shows that areas west 
of the Cascade Mountain Range, including Benton County, lie in Zone 3 
(See Figure 1).  Both the Scotts Mills and Klamath Falls earthquakes, 
which took place in 1993, were considered "wake up calls" to 
Oregonians.  The Emergency Services Coordinator and Key Informant 
have stressed the importance of preparing for earthquakes since 
there may be more seismic activity in the future. 
Oregon is vulnerable to three types of earthquakes: crustal, 
interplate, and subduction zone (Madin and Mabey, 1993).  Crustal 
earthquakes occur along active faults which may be visible from the 
surface.  Interplate earthquakes, such as the Puget Sound earthquake 
in 1949, could reach a magnitude 7.4 on the Richter scale (ibid.). 
Scientists at the Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral 
Industries (DOGAMI) have focused their research on the Cascadia 
Subduction Zone, which lies about 50 miles offshore and extends 77 
Figure 1: Seismic Risk Map of Oregon  (Uniform Building Codes
Agency,  1994) 
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from the middle of Vancouver Island, B.C., past Washington and 
Oregon to Northern California (See Figure 2).  This is where the Juan 
de Fuca Plate is moving away from the Pacific Plate and towards the 
North American Plate.  Where they meet, the Juan de Fuca Plate is 
thrust beneath the North American Plate (subducted) along a great 
fault called the Cascadia Subduction Zone (DOGAMI report, 1994). 
Carbon-14 dates from Oregon coastal marshlands indicate a 
subduction zone earthquake (magnitude 8 or greater) and 
subsequent tsunamis inundated low-lying coastal areas about 300 
years ago (Madin, 1993).  Geoscientists estimated subduction zone 
earthquakes take place every 300 to 600 years (ibid.).  Although it is 
uncertain when this could take place, experts are gearing up for a 
subduction zone quake that could severely affect the entire Pacific 
Northwest.  Planners anticipate that earthquakes would cause many 
fatalities and disrupt critical lifelines (communication, transportation, 
and public utilities).  In addition, earthquakes might trigger other 
hazards, such as fires, floods, dam failures, and hazardous materials 
spills (Benton County Hazards Analysis, 1994: 3). 
The amount of earthquake damage in Benton County as 
elsewhere depends upon several factors: distance from epicenter, 
local soil conditions, and types of construction.  Buildings of all types 
that are located on steep soil slopes may be at risk due to landslides 
triggered by an earthquake.  Buildings constructed on liquefiable soil 
(water-saturated loose sand or silt typically found in floodplain, 
beach, or sandspit) may also be damaged when the soil loses its 
strength during an earthquake (DOGAMI report, 1994).  In Benton 79 
Figure 2: Cascadia Subduction Zone Map (Goldfinger, 1990)
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County, an engineering study would need to be done to determine 
such locations along the Willamette River 
It is important to note that earthquakes occurring near 
Portland, off the Oregon coast, or in the Puget Sound, Washington, 
areas may affect Benton County, too.  Table 10 shows the list of 
Pacific Northwest tremors that have been felt in Benton County. 
Previous seismic activity indicates perhaps more earthquakes may 
occur in the future. 
Plate 3 shows the geologic features of Benton County.  Bela et 
al. (1979) mapped several faults, including the Corvallis Fault, which 
runs through the northeast corner of Benton County near major 
concentrations of population (Goldfinger, 1990).  Measuring 34 miles 
in length, it is thought to be the longest in the Willamette Valley. 
This fault separates the older and upthrown Siletz River Volcanics 
(Tsr) from the younger and downthrown middle and later Eocene 
sandstone (Tf and Ts).  Since no Quaternary units (Qral, Qtl, Qtm, Qth) 
have been displaced, field evidence suggests that surface faults are 
inactive.  However, more studies are needed, and might alter current 
perspective of active faulting within the Willamette Valley and Coast 
Range (Geologic Hazards of Eastern Benton County, 1979). 81 
Table 10: Selected Summary of Earthquakes felt in Benton Co. (1891­
1993)
 
Date  Epicenter  Mercalli  Mercalli  Comments 
intensity  intensity in 
(Richter  Benton Co. 
magnitude) 
W16/1891  Salem  IV  Brief, distinct shock followed by 
wavelike motion; windows rattled. 
4/2/1896  McMinnville  VI  People awakened; 2-3 shocks with 
loud rumbling noise from west. 
2/25/1921  Cascadia  V  Felt by nearly all in 6-by-12-mile 
area. 
7/18/1930  Perrydale  VI  Cracked plaster, rattled windows near 
Perrydale. 
5/12/1942  Corvallis  V  V  Local shock, strongly felt. 
4/1311949  Puget Sound, 
Washington 
VIII (7.1)  VI (Corvallis)  Largest earthquake of record in 
Pacific NW; felt over 150,000 sq. 
mile area. 
11/4/1953  About 100 mi off  III (Corvallis)  Short but sharp tremor 
Oregon coast 
12/15/1953  Portland  VI  Salem, light vibration I-III; not felt 
in Albany or Corvallis. 
322/1957  Alsea  III  Two light tremors reported 4 hr. 
After principal shock (mag. 5.3, 
intensity VII) hit San Francisco; 
tremors felt while aftershocks in 
S.F. still occurring 
11/16/1957  Coast Range  VI (Salem)  N (Corvallis)  One of the largest documented 
(Tillamook-
Portland) 
earthquakes for Coast Range; 
reported not felt in Albany or 
Monroe. 
8/18/1961  East of Salem  VI (Albany and  N (Corvallis)  Plaster cracks at some Albany 
Lebanon)  residences; felt over NW Oregon. 
11/5/1962  Portland- VI (5.0)  IV (Corvallis,  New seismic stations in Pacific NW 
Vancouver  Philomath, and  in place which provided first 
Alsea)  significant data to construct travel-
time curves for Oregon; felt over 
20,000 sq. miles 
3/7/1963  Coast Range  V (West  IV (Corvallis)  One of the largest documented 
(Tillamook-Salem)  Salem) 
(4.6) 
earthquakes for Coast Range; minor 
quake felt from Portland-Eugene 
4/29/1965  Puget Sound,  VII-VIII (6.5)  V (Corvallis  Second largest earthquake of record 
Washington  Philomath)  in Pacific NW; Portland intensity V; 
not felt in Alsea, Wren or Albany. 
325/1993  Scotts Mills  IV-VI 
(5.6) 
Sources: Bela et al. (1979); Berg and Baker (1963); Couch and Lowell 
(1971); Coffman and von Hake (1973); Bodle (1946); Coast and 
Geodetic Survey (1945-1966). 82 
4. Fire/Wildland Fire 
Another potential hazard in Benton County is fire/wildland fire, 
which involves "uncontrolled burning in residential, commercial, 
industrial, rural, and unincorporated areas of structures or wild 
lands" (Benton County Hazard Analysis, 1994: 4).  Urban fire 
occurrences are also common within the incorporated areas of the 
County.  There is also a threat of wildland/urban interface fires from 
areas of undeveloped property adjacent to urban centers. 
The Oregon State Department of Forestry (ODF) conducted a fire 
hazard risk survey in 1991.  ODF developed an analysis of daily fire 
danger rating indices in their area of protection, which is mainly the 
western half of Benton County, excluding National Forest and 
Research forest areas and urban centers (OAR 629-47-025).  Plate 4 
shows the high, and extreme high risk areas in ODF's jurisdiction. 
How forest fires establish themselves, how they develop, and 
whether they get out of hand, depends largely upon the following 
factors: fire protection; fire weather conditions; topography; slope 
gradient; and vegetative fuels loads (Ebert, 1988: 154).  In most 
cases, it is the combined interaction of these hazard factors that 
creates the specific dynamic characteristic of each fire (ibid.). 
For Benton County, other government agencies are responsible 
for fire protection.  For instance, the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) contracts out its fire protection services to ODF. ODF also 
shares responsibility with eleven Rural Fire Protection Districts 
(RFPD) in Benton County: Hoskins-Kings Valley RFPD; Blodgett RFPD; 
Alsea RFPD; Philomath RFPD; Adair RFPD; Palestine RFPD; North 83 
Albany RFPD; Corvallis RFPD; Monroe RFPD; Pedee RFPD; and Polk Co.
 
No. 1 RFPD. 
Rural fire protection districts, which are mainly staffed by 
volunteers, work to reduce fire dangers by individual mitigation 
efforts.  For instance, Corvallis Fire Department went door-to-door in 
the high risk area of Vineyard Mountain in August, 1994 (Corvallis 
Fire Marshall interview, Sept. 1994).  Residents were educated about 
fire prevention strategies, such as planting fire-resistant vegetation 
around existing structures.  Some insurance companies also require 
homeowners to "fire-proof" structures.  The county also has 
guidelines for specific road widths and turn-arounds for fire engines 
and water tankers so that they can provide services during a fire. 
5. Flood 
The National Flood Insurance Program began when legislation 
was passed in 1968 in response to the mounting loss of life and 
property due to flooding in the United States (Rossi, Wright and 
Weber-Burdin, 1982,  p.  137).  The program enabled property 
owners to purchase government-subsidized flood insurance. 
Residents in eligible communities may also insure their personal 
property against flood loss.  It also discouraged unwise use of flood-
prone lands.  Thus, subsidized insurance is available to communities 
that adopt and enforce certain floodplain management regulations 
(Rossi et al., 1982: 138). 
Benton County takes advantage of this program since much of 
the Willamette Valley is located on floodplain and former wetland 
areas, resulting in occasional regional and local flooding (Benton 84 
County Hazard Analysis, 1994, p. 4).  Inland flooding is most
 
commonly caused by the overflow of streams (Palm, 1990, pp. 11­
12).  This type of flooding, sometimes called riverine flooding, is 
brought about by heavy rainfall, rapid snowmelt, the constriction of 
channels (log, ice, or debris jams producing a backup of water 
upstream), dam failure, or some disturbance in the watershed (Griggs 
and Gilchrist, 1983).  Furthermore, overflow of storm sewer systems 
due to drainage system failure following heavy rain and rapid snow 
melt may cause flooding (Benton County Hazard Analysis, 1994, p. 4). 
Historically, there has been periodic overflow of the Willamette and 
Marys rivers.  One prominent flood, which took place in 1977, 
inundated much of the Willamette Valley following heavy rains and 
rapid snow melt (ibid.). 
Areas particularly at risk from riverine flooding are defined by 
planners as floodplains, usually delineated in accordance with the 
National Flood Insurance Administration program as areas with a 1.0 
percent probability of being inundated in any given year (Palm, 
1990, p.  11).  Floodplains are those areas which are most susceptible 
to flooding from nearby streams.  Plate 5 identifies floodplains and 
floodways along streams and rivers in Benton County.  FEMA 
forecasts the 100-year flood on the basis of historical information 
and rainfall, as well as detailed analysis of flooding patterns in each 
community (FEMA Flood Insurance Study of Benton County, Aug. 5, 
1986 ) . 85 
6.  Utility Failure 
Basic power services, such as electricity, gas, water, and 
communications, are important lifelines.  Utility failure is defined as 
"interruption or loss of electrical and/or natural gas service or other 
critical utilities for an extended period of time" (Benton County 
Hazard Analysis, 1994, p. 5).  According to an utility spokesperson 
for Central Oregon, "over the last couple of years, there has not been 
a major power failure for this area" (Interview, March 29, 1995). 
Other than feeder outages, there have been few difficulties (ibid.). 
The last major outage occurred during the Columbus Day Storm in 
1962 (ibid.).  Plate 6, which was created by Benton County Public 
Works, shows the areas where five utility services operate in Benton 
County: Consumer Power Inc.; Pacific, Power and Light; Monroe 
Telephone; Pioneer; and US West. 
7. Enemy Attack 
National defense policy recognizes the possibility of an attack 
on the United States with conventional, biological or chemical 
weapons (Benton County Hazard Analysis, 1994, p. 3).  It does, 
however, accept that the threat of nuclear attack has diminished 
greatly in recent years and is no longer considered the primary 
threat (ibid.)  The absence of military facilities or high value targets 
in the County significantly reduces the probability of this threat.  No 
map was developed for this hazard because the risk for enemy 
attack could not be determined. 86 
8. Drought 
Benton County has experienced mild problems with drought 
conditions.  Negative impacts of a drought are threefold: they 
threaten the availability of drinking water and fire suppression 
resources, and also severely damage the water-dependent 
agricultural and other industries in Benton County (Benton County 
Hazard Analysis, 1994: 2-3).  In 1992, thirty-two counties in Oregon 
(including Benton County) were declared a disaster area because of 
continuing drought conditions (ibid.).  An U.S. Soil Conservation 
Service report (September, 1994), concluding that Benton County's 
rating for drought was mild, whereas the southeastern and central 
counties in Oregon were extreme risk to drought conditions. 
However, drought continues to be a potential hazard in Benton 
County. 
9. Civil Disorder 
Civil disorder, which is defined as "any incident with the intent 
of disrupting a community to the degree that police intervention is 
required to maintain public safety... and includes riot, protests, 
demonstrations, strikes, and acts of terrorism" (Benton County 
Hazard Analysis, 1994, p. 3).  While there is no record of major 
occurrences of civil disorder in the county, several Oregon State 
University student parties and snowball fights have disrupted 
neighborhoods in and around the university for short periods of 
time.  There have been a few political demonstrations over the years 
requiring policing above and beyond the normal day-to-day staffing 
(ibid.).  No map was created for this hazard. 87 
10. Volcanic Ash Fallout 
Benton County is situated near the Cascade Mountain range. 
Several dormant volcanoes could possibly erupt in the future. 
Scientists have been studying Mount Hood and Mount St. Helens in 
the north, as well as the Three Sisters, Mount Bachelor, and 
Newberry Crater areas in the east.  Volcanic ash fallout would be the 
only adverse effect that would affect this area.  This depends on 
several characteristics, such as height of eruption column, 
atmospheric conditions, and prevailing wind direction (Benton 
County Hazard Analysis, 1994: 5-6).  No map was created for this 
hazard. 
11. Dam Failure 
Since Benton County is located downstream from six dams in 
Lane County (Hills Creek, Lookout Point, Dexter, Cougar, Fall Creek, 
and Fern Ridge), dam failure could cause sudden catastrophic 
flooding here.  The most extensive inundation would occur if Hills 
Creek Dam were to fail, as the resulting flood waters would breach 
Lookout Point and Dexter Dams, and then continue down the 
Willamette River and cause flooding in portions of the surrounding 
countryside in Benton County.  Most likely, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers would be able to provide advanced warning as the water 
approaches, usually 8 to 11 hours for the Monroe area, depending on 
the dams under stress (Benton County Hazard Analysis, 1994, p. 2). 
Army Corps of Engineers Flood Inundation maps (1987) are available 
for each dam. 88 
12. Radiological Incident 
The final type of hazard that poses a threat in Benton County is 
a radiological incident, either located at a fixed site, or during 
transportation.  In 1994, nine organizations were given licenses for 
storing radioactive materials on sites throughout the county (See 
Table 11). 
Table 11: List of Radiological Material Licensees in Benton County 
(1994) 
vocation  Purpose 
Oregon State University  Broad scope A 
Good Samaritan  Hospital  Medical  diagnosis/therapy 
Benton Co. Public Works  Industrial  gauge 
Antivirals,  Inc.  Research and development 
CH2M Hill, Inc.  Gas chromator 
Evanite Fiber Corp.  Fixed gauge; gas chromator 
Foundation  Engineering  Industrial  gauge 
Morse Brothers Inc.  Industrial  gauge 
NCASI  Gas chromator 
Source: Oregon State Health  Division (March 31, 1994) 
Oregon State University is the site of a small nuclear reactor 
that is used for "research, education, and scientific experiments" 
(Benton County Hazard Analysis, 1994, p. 5).  (See Plate 2). 
According to the Emergency Services Coordinator, "Due to the design 
of the facility and the small amount of radiological material on site, 
the reactor is not considered a significant hazard" (ibid.).  Should an 
emergency develop, only the immediate area inside the reactor 
facility would likely be affected (ibid.).  In addition, the Department 
of Energy requires that Oregon State University's Office of 89 
Radiological Safety maintain and exercise an emergency response 
plan for this facility.  Other facilities, such as Good Samaritan Hospital 
(Corvallis) primarily used radiological materials for testing 
equipment and radio-pharmaceuticals. 
Benton County has determined high risk areas hazard locations 
as accurately as possible.  However, this is difficult to accomplish 
without more specific engineering studies.  This hazard analysis 
specifies twelve threats for which the EOP will outline the who, what, 
where, and how to coordinate an effective response during a disaster. 
Step 2: Formulating Basic Plan 
After determining the hazard analysis, the next major step was 
to create a basic plan and divide various emergency functions and 
services.  The Emergency Services Coordinator himself researched 
background information about the County, neighboring jurisdictions, 
and legal statutes, in addition to reviewing the existing EOP.  He 
wrote a draft copy of the basic plan, which is a relatively brief 
statement of legal authority providing the basis for the plan.  It 
indicates the missions, concepts, and policies governing operations 
which a community confronts during a disaster (CPG 1-8, April 1982, 
p. 6; Draft copy of Benton County Basic Plan, October, 1, 1994).  The 
Basic Plan serves as an outline for developing Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs), which are based on contingency planning.  Public 
safety officials and other planning participants realize that they 
cannot fully anticipate all circumstances of a disaster; contingency 
plans help them think about all the "what ifs" before a disaster 
strikes.  For example, the Emergency Services Coordinator has 90 
anticipated that telephone lines will be out of service, or heavily 
taxed during an emergency.  Consequently, there is a 
communications planning committee, which is made up of people 
with knowledge of alternative modes of communication, such as 
volunteers who specialize in ham radio operations, and 
representatives from the cellular phone industry.  They have 
discussed various options for maintaining these vital communication 
lifelines to ensure an effective response during disasters.  Hence, 
SOPs are intended to be a planning tool to be used before and during 
disaster operations (CPG 1-8, Sept. 10, 1990, p. 2-7). 
While the basic plan provides information relevant to the EOP 
as a whole, special expanded sections of the plan called functional 
annexes emphasize responsibilities, tasks, procedures, and 
operational actions that pertain to the function being covered. 
Planning committees are required to formulate functional annexes, 
which are key components of the EOP that define specific tasks and 
indicate who is responsible for carrying out those tasks. 
At a January 1994 planning meeting with functional annex 
chiefs, the Emergency Services Coordinator formed planning 
committees to assist him in writing twenty-two functional annexes. 
His agenda included explaining the roles and responsibilities of the 
principal participants, especially the elected officials.  Annex chiefs 
were appointed to head up each of the committees responsible for 
re-writing that functional annex.  For instance, Benton County's 
sheriff was chosen to chair the law enforcement functional annexes 
based on his position, legal authority, expertise, and qualifications. 91 
Next, participants signed up to be on a specific functional annex 
to improve coordination of the EOP during a disaster.  Individuals 
from various city, county, and state agencies, volunteer organizations, 
private businesses, medical services groups, OSU and school district 
officials, media representatives, and others now serve on functional 
annexes according to their experience and interest (See Table 12 for 
list of functional annexes and committee assignments).  For instance, 
the American Red Cross is responsible for identifying shelters 
available to the community during disasters.  Therefore, it is logical 
for the Linn-Benton Red Cross chapter director to be the annex chief 
of the Shelter, Reception, and Mass Care Functional Annex.  Other 
members on that committee include representatives from the 
Salvation Army, Oregon State University, School District, Corvallis 
Parks and Recreation, Humane Society, and Community Services 
Consortium.  Their task was to formulate a plan outlining how they 
will set up a shelter.  It was often difficult to agree on the procedures 
for informing the public on shelter locations, in addition to preparing 
shelters with necessary resources to maintain an effective shelter. 
However, working these procedures out in advance, as well as 
identifying who was responsible for those tasks, will improve 
response capabilities during a disaster. 
After planning committees were organized for the functional 
annex formulation, the Emergency Services Coordinator 
recommended that they follow a particular format to complete their 
section of the EOP.  He also provided committees with planning 
materials, such as sample plans from other counties.  For instance, 92 
Table 12: Functional Annex and Planning Committee Assignments
 
Annex 
Basic Plan 
Hazard 
Analysis 
Communi­
cations 
Direction & 
Control 
Warning 
Emergency 
Public In­
formation 
Evacuation 
Shelter, 
Reception & 
Mass Care 
Health & 
Medical 
Law 
Enforcement 
Public Works 
Fire/Rescue 
Radiological 
Protection 
Human 
Services 
Resource 
Management 
Damage 
Assessment 
Legal 
Hazard 
Mitigation 
Trans­
portation 
Training & 
Exercises 
Recovery 
Committee  Members 
Co. Emergency Management; Emergency Coordinators in  Corvallis and Albany; 
Benton Co. Fire Defense Board (BCFDB); Benton County Emergency 
Management Council; Valley Echo CAER Group 
Co. Emergency Management; Corvallis Fire Dept., County Commissioner; 
Sheriff; County Public Works, Albany Fire Dept. 
Corvallis Police 9-1-1; Sheriff's Office; Amateur Radio Emergency Services; 
Corvallis Public Works; (BCFDB); US West/Cellular One representatives; 
Clackamas  Communications 
Sheriff; Corvallis Police; Albany and Corvallis Emergency Coordinators; County 
Emergency Services 
Emergency Services; Sheriff's Office; Albany and Corvallis Emergency 
Coordinators; KOAC Engineer; School District representative; OSU 
County Community Relations; Corvallis, Philomath and Albany Public 
Information Officers (PIO); Electronic and Print Media representatives; Media 
representative; OSU 
Sheriff; Corvallis, Philomath, and Albany Police; Oregon Dept. of 
Transportation; Oregon State Police; Transportation Annex chief; Hewlett-
Packard 
American Red Cross; Salvation Army; OSU; school district representatives; 
Corvallis Parks & Recreation; Humane Society; Community Services 
Consortium 
County Health Dept.; Good Samaritan Hospital; Corvallis and Albany fire dept.; 
Funeral  directors  representatives; OSU Student Health Center 
Sheriff; Corvallis, Philomath, and Albany Police; Oregon State Police; Oregon 
State Forestry; Siuslaw National Forest; District Attorney 
County Public Works; Corvallis, Philomath, Monroe, Albany, and Adair Village 
public works; OSU Physical Plant; Corvallis Disposal 
Corvallis Fire Chief; BCFDB; Dept. of Forestry; Corvallis Mountain Rescue 
Emergency Services; OSU Radiation Center; HAZMAT Team for Linn-Benton-
Lane Counties; County Health  Dept.; Corvallis/Albany emergency coordinators 
Community Services Consortium; County Mental Health; school district 
representatives; OSU; United Way; Council on Government; Educational 
Service  District;  Clergy representatives 
County Public Works; County Finance Director; BCFDB; Corvallis, Albany, 
Philomath public works; Oregon National Guard; County Personnel Director; 
Morse Bros. Inc.; Corvallis Disposal 
County Assessor; Albany & Corvallis building dept.; Red Cross; Albany, 
Philomath & Corvallis public works; Benton Co. Public Works; ODOT
 
County Counsel; Corvallis, Albany, and Philomath City Attorneys
 
Emergency Services; Corvallis and Albany Emergency Coordinators; Red Cross;
 
school district representative; OSU; Valley CAER Group
 
Corvallis Transit System Manager; Mayflower Bus Co., Albany Transit System;
 
Dial-A-Bus; OSU Motor Pool; Olson Bus Co.; Crowson Bus Co.
 
Emergency Services; Corvallis and Albany Emergency Coordinators; Red Cross;
 
Benton Co. Emergency Management Council (BCEMC)
 
Emergency Management; Corvallis, Albany Emergency Management; BCEMC;
 
Valley Echo CAER Group; Benton Co. Agent of Record; County Health Dept.;
 
County Development Dept.;  Utility and Building Dept.; Corvallis Homebuilders
 
Source: Benton County Emergency Services, 1994
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each annex chief received a folder containing materials planning 
committee roster, and a former EOP (on paper and computer disk). 
He also encouraged the committees to conduct additional research in 
order to make the annex more comprehensive (Emergency Services 
Coordinator's letter to the County Counsel, Jan. 25, 1994).  Tasks were 
divided among participants, and the Emergency Coordinator 
requested that annex committees keep him informed of their 
progress.  He said he would be available if they needed additional 
assistance.  He gave the planning committees 60 days to complete the 
initial draft.  Other guidelines were specified in a letter of 
instructions to annex chiefs (Jan. 21, 1994): 
1. To ensure that all plans are current and fully coordinated, 
existing plans should be reviewed by the committee.  If 
inconsistencies exist, they should be identified and resolved 
with the person responsible for that plan.  If differences 
can't be resolved, contact the Emergency Coordinator. 
2. You are free to consult additional sources or add to your 
committee as necessary to accomplish your task. 
3. The draft document should be submitted to the Office of 
Emergency Management in hard copy for the first review, 
and in both hard copy and on disk for the final review.  The 
draft document should be prepared in a DOS format on Word 
or WordPerfect. 
4. Remember, this is primarily a "who" document; it assigns 
responsibility to various departments or organizations for a 
particular function.  The details of "how" something will be 
done, belong in the Standard Operating Procedures for the 
department or organization that has responsibility for that 
function under the plan.  It is not necessary to repeat 
procedures in the County plan that currently exist in 
another plan, simply provide a brief summation and 
reference the plan that contains the procedures. 94 
5. Please save the background materials and return them
 
when the project is complete (letter to functional annex 
chief, Jan. 21, 1994). 
In addition to making himself available to planning 
committees, the Emergency Services Coordinator has maintained 
dialogue with planning committee participants to improve each 
functional annex.  For instance, he met with public works officials 
from the City of Corvallis, City of Philomath, and Benton County 
Public Works to refine their annex (interview, Benton County Public 
Works representative, May 26, 1995).  In this case, several drafts 
were circulated among committee members until  it was satisfactory 
(ibid.).  Planning committees and the Emergency Services Coordinator 
reviewed annexes and worked to make further improvements.  Then, 
the Emergency Services Coordinator facilitated joint meetings of 
various subcommittees for different functions to make sure that 
participants had a good understanding of their tasks. 
Step 3: Coordinating Plan 
In addition to meeting informally with the planning 
committees to facilitate re-writing functional annexes, the Emergency 
Services Coordinator has encouraged more participation.  However, 
he said this has been difficult and time-consuming to include more 
people in this process.  He continuously contacted several annex 
chiefs to review progress and assist with organizational problems.  In 
fact, the Emergency Services Coordinator noted that they are behind 
on their pre-arranged timeline.  As of April, 1995, only a few of the 
annexes have been completed or drafted.  One annex (Hazard 95 
Analysis) has been formally approved by OEM; two annexes (Basic 
Plan and Legal) are completed, but are waiting to be submitted to 
OEM as an entire document with the 22 functional annexes;  five 
annexes (Direction and Control, Emergency Information, Public 
Works, Radiological Protection, and Legal) have been drafted, but are 
waiting to be coordinated among various committee members; six 
annexes (Communication, Fire and Rescue, Evacuation, Human 
Services, Shelter, Reception, and Mass Care, and Health and Medical) 
are in the process of writing a draft; and eight annexes (Warning, 
Law Enforcement, Resource Management, Damage Assessment, 
Hazard Mitigation, Transportation, Training and Exercises, and 
Recovery) have not been started.  The Emergency Services 
Coordinator said he did not anticipate that the process would take 
this long (interview, April 27, 1995).  Eventually, functional annexes 
will be reviewed and coordinated with other annexes by an oversight 
committee, he said (ibid.). 
The Emergency Services Coordinator attributed the delay in 
completing the functional annexes to one key reason: planning 
participants have taken on emergency planning tasks as an added-on 
responsibility.  Often, they are unable to make adequate time for 
formulating disaster plans when they have to attend to day-to-day 
responsibilities.  Thus, it difficult to coordinate all the various 
planning  participants. 
The Emergency Coordinator noted that the Council, headed by 
the Key Informant, has been effective for motivating and informing 
planning participants.  During regularly scheduled meetings, planning 
participants were reminded of how vital their involvement is in the 96 
planning process.  The Emergency Services Coordinator described the 
Council as a "vehicle" to accomplish disaster planning tasks.  He also 
cited the Key Informant's role in this process.  This citizen has been 
instrumental in keeping emergency preparedness on leaders' 
agendas.  For instance, she has met with county commissioners, the 
sheriff, and Emergency Services Coordinator, as well as planning 
participants during bi-monthly Council meetings.  Subsequently, both 
the Coordinator and the Key Informant have realized the importance 
of maintaining the support of the county commissioners, the sheriff, 
mayors, and various local agency department heads.  Yet, several 
have attended Council meetings only occasionally.  The Emergency 
Services Coordinator continued to contact county commissioners, 
sheriff, mayors, department leaders in meetings and through memos 
to maintain communication and exchange ideas.  He has discussed the 
progress of his planning approach, and said he was concerned that 
without their support, the planning committees lacked accountability. 
Getting the commitment of elected officials and other community 
leaders is a difficult, yet an essential aspect of disaster planning to 
promote inter-agency coordination and cooperation. 
After the functional annexes have been completed and 
coordinated, the Emergency Services Coordinator anticipates the next 
step is to write seven hazard specific annexes for flood, winter storm, 
hazardous materials spills, earthquake, wildland fire,  civil disorder, 
and nuclear attack (Benton County EOP's Rewrite Timeline, 1994). 
Benton County has not started this task.  When the functional and 
hazard specific annexes are completed, the Emergency Services 
Coordinator said that a final EOP draft will be produced, and then 97 
given to all planning team members, such as other local 
governments, planning councils, FEMA regional office, private 
disaster relief organizations.  Copies will be submitted to reviewing 
authorities and to other organizations to ensure an effective 
coordination during disasters.  A final planning meeting will be held 
to discuss any further required changes.  Decisions will be made for 
presenting the EOP and deciding how to implement it.  As mentioned 
previously, bringing the EOP together is a complicated task since 
individuals may be aware of his/her own role during a disaster, yet 
may not be certain of others' roles.  Indeed, sharing information in 
the EOP is critical for supporting preparedness for joint operations in 
large-scale disasters affecting multiple jurisdictions.  By dividing the 
tasks among various planning committees, the Emergency Services 
Coordinator tried to stimulate interest and obtain community support 
for the EOP.  At this point, the Emergency Services Coordinator has 
been trying to figure out an effective way to involve various public, 
private, and volunteer organizations in coordinating the new EOP. 
Step 4: Exercising Plan 
Oregon Emergency Management requires counties to 
participate in drills each year.  This is one way to know if a 
community and its planning participants are ready for disaster 
without a disaster actually occurring.  There are three types of 
exercises: 
1. Tabletop exercise: An activity in which elected and 
appointed officials and key agency staff are presented 98 
with a simulated emergency situation without time 
constraints.  It is usually informal... and designed to 
elicit constructive discussion by the participants as 
they attempt to examine and then resolve problems. 
The purpose is for participants to evaluate plans and 
procedures and to resolves questions of coordination 
and assignment of responsibilities in a non­
threatening format and under minimum stress. 
2. Functional Exercise: An activity designed to test or 
evaluate the capability of an individual function or 
complex activity within a function.  It is applicable 
where the activity is capable of being evaluated in 
isolation from other emergency management activities. 
3. Full-Scale Exercise: This is intended to evaluate the 
operational capability of emergency management 
systems in an interactive manner over a substantial 
period of time.  It involves the testing of a major 
portion of the emergency plan and organizations in a 
stress environment. This type of exercise includes 
mobilization of personnel, resources, and actual 
movement of workers, equipment, and resources 
required to demonstrate coordination and response 
capability (OEM Sample Plan, April 28, 1994: G-4) 
For example, Benton County has participated in a statewide 
earthquake drill, or full-scale exercise, called "Quake-X '94 on April 
13-24, 1994.  The Oregon Emergency Management office organized 
the drill, and the Emergency Services Coordinator attended pre-
planning meetings to discuss the exercise.  Several public, private, 
and volunteer groups from Benton County and other levels of 
government participated in this subduction zone earthquake 
simulation: eleven Benton County agencies; eight municipal agencies; 
Oregon Department of Transportation and Oregon Emergency 
Management; and eight private/volunteer organizations participated 99 
in "Quake-X '94" (Participant observation, April 13, 1994; Quake-X 
Benton County Players' Handbook, April 1, 1994: 4-5).  Organizers 
said the goal of this exercise was to improve inter-agency 
coordination in the event of a large-scale disaster, such as a 
subduction zone earthquake off the Oregon coast. 
In December of 1994, Benton County Emergency Services and 
the Council's Operations Subcommittee organized an exercise for 
private industry called, "Violence in the Workplace."  The newly 
completed Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was used for the first 
time in this exercise (Participant Observation, Jan. 18, 1994).  The 
drill emphasized potential and actual communication issues between 
the EOC and emergency personnel (i.e., fire, police) in the field.  As a 
result, one business that participated in this functional exercise 
donated a fax machine, scanner, and color computer monitor to 
improve communications during future emergencies.  The Emergency 
Services Coordinator referred to exercises as "lessons learned" for 
future  disasters. 
This planning approach is unique in that private businesses not 
only organized exercises, but also served on functional annexes, such 
as evacuation, resource management, transportation and recovery. 
These groups can benefit the community during disasters because 
they provide the other resources besides computers and fax 
machines, but also sand bags, bulldozers, temporary shelters, and a 
variety of professional skills.  Lastly, local government and private 
industries have exchanged information by cooperative training 
efforts, informal visits, attending Council meetings, and participating 
with exercises and drills. 100 
Step 5: Evaluating Plan 
The final stage in the disaster planning process involves 
evaluating and maintaining the EOP.  While Benton County has not 
reached this stage in the planning process, the Emergency Services 
Coordinator has used and evaluated the current EOP during exercises 
and drills.  The exercise program is a fundamental part of ensuring 
that the EOP is examined periodically and remains familiar to the 
participants responsible for emergency management functions.  In 
this way, participants are reminded that disaster planning is a 
cyclical process.  The Emergency Services Coordinator, planning 
participants, and Council members focus on more than just assessing 
hazards, formulating, coordinating, exercising, and evaluating as they 
re-write EOP.  They have developed networks, maintained 
discussions, and have been educated about their tasks as they 
complete functional and hazard specific annexes, as well as 
participate in exercises.  Benton County does not focus on the EOP as 
the end product for disaster planning, rather, they seek a continuous 
planning process.  However, it is apparent that Benton County 
struggles to meet pre-established goals of community involvement 
within a realistic timeline.  The next section will explore six aspects 
of disaster planning specific to Benton County. 
Six process characteristics  in Benton County 
So far this chapter has looked at the background to disaster 
planning in Benton County, as well as described the stages in 
planning.  For the purposes of this study, the researcher chose to 
examine six process characteristics (organizational structure, problem 101 
definition, leadership approach, citizen involvement, role of experts, 
and outcome) of disaster planning in Benton County. 
Organizational Structure 
There are two interrelated organizational structures involved 
with disaster planning in Benton County.  First, the Office of 
Emergency Services plans and prepares for disasters in Benton 
County within an external, hierarchical organizational structure that 
includes state and federal agencies.  For instance, two external 
emergency management agencies, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) and Oregon Emergency Management (OEM) provide 
financial and technical assistance to Benton County for disaster 
planning. 
Federal dollars funnel down to counties through OEM, which is 
the state agency responsible for guaranteeing federal funds are spent 
properly, as described in ORS 401.280: 
More than 80 percent of OEM's operating budget comes 
from FEMA.  Emergency Management Assistance (EMA) 
programs provide pass-through funding to local 
government to assist in the maintenance of emergency 
management facilities.  FEMA requires that a minimum of 
two-thirds of the EMA funding be given to local 
emergency management agencies (for planning, training, 
and preparedness activities) (OEM handout, 1993, p. 2). 
In FY 1994-95, Benton County received $27,000 from FEMA. 
Benton County also allocated $103,809 from the General Fund for 
emergency services (See Table 13).  Benton County projected a slight 102
 
increase in FEMA funds for the next year to $35,000 (Benton County 
Budget, FY 1994-95, p. 74). 
Table 13:  Benton County Budget for Emergency Services (1991-97) 
91-92  92-93  93-94  94-95  95-96  96-97 
Actual  Actual  Budget  Budget  Projected  Projected 
Fees  0 0 0 0  0  0 
Unrestricted  Funds/Taxes  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Program Dedicated Funds  40,191  32,530  27,000  27,000  35,000  24,000 
Total Revenues  40,191  32,530  27,000  27,000  35,000  24,000 
Personal  Services  61,066  79,008  66,463  72,440  77,399  80,058 
(Salaries) 
Materials and Services  9,955  10,412  17,355  25,901  26,652  27,406 
Capital Outlay  0  6,974  12,399  5,000  5,000  5,000 
Other  0 0 0 0  0  0 
Total Expenditure  71,021  96,394  96,217.  101,341  109,051  112,464 
p General Fund Requirement 1 -30,8301 - 63,864 -69,2171 -76,341 1  -74,051 1  -88,4641 
Source: Benton County Budget, FY 94-95: 73 
There are five basic tasks that FEMA requires LEMAs to 
complete before they can receive federal, or "Emergency 
Management Assistance (EMA)" funding: 
1. Coordination and implementation of a local integrated 
Emergency Management System which includes the all-
hazard environment approach emphasizing survivable crisis 
management systems. 
2. Review and update of the emergency management policies, 
plans, and emergency guidelines as identified in the 
attached function specific workplan. 
3. Operating procedures/emergency guidelines are to be 
reviewed, updated, and exercised in accordance with FEMA's 
State and Local Exercise Requirements. 
4. The local Emergency Management Program staff will attend 
related training events during the fiscal year for a minimum 
combined total of twenty hours. 103 
5. Consistent with local resources and needs, additional 
activities may be programmed as deemed necessary and 
appropriate by the Chief Executive Officer (Local/State 
Comprehensive Cooperative Agreement, FY 95). 
In addition to annual federal funding distributed by OEM, local 
emergency agencies can apply for FEMA mitigation and preparedness 
activities.  In 1990, Benton County applied for a FEMA emergency 
preparedness grant (Key Informant interview, March 30,  1995). 
However, only one grant was given annually per region, and Alaska 
received it for Region X in 1991 (Key informant interview,  July 8, 
1994).  No other attempts for grants have been made. 
Another potential source of revenue for LEMA's coffers was 
introduced during the Oregon State legislative session in Spring of 
1995.  However, the bill "Disaster Management, Preparedness, 
Mitigation, Response and Recovery Trust Fund" (HB 3440), did not 
reach the House Floor.  That bill proposed an estimated $7 million in 
revenue would be generated for Oregon's local emergency services 
programs annually (Participant Observation, Oregon Emergency 
Management Association meeting, Feb. 6, 1995; Emergency Services 
Coordinator interview, March 31, 1995).  The sponsor of that bill, 
Oregon Representative Gordley, a Portland Democrat, requested that 
a bi-partisan task force look at re-introducing a similar bill during 
the interim period for a future session (letter, April 14, 1995). 
(Currently, only Florida has a program which requires a percentage 
of homeowners' and private industry's insurance premiums to be 
designated to a statewide emergency services trust fund.) 104 
FEMA has designed five courses as part of its Professional 
Development Series (PDS), including emergency planning, for people 
involved in emergency services (Participant Observation, May 16-20, 
1994).  These courses are organized throughout the state by OEM to 
provide county coordinators and others with technical assistance for 
disaster planning.  During 1994-95, five Benton County officials 
completed all five PDS courses, and six persons attended at least one 
PDS course, including the researcher (Emergency Services 
Coordinator interview, March 31, 1995).  In addition, FEMA offers 
training and educational courses at their Emergency Management 
Institute (EMI) in Emmitsburg, Maryland.  In 1994-95, four Benton 
County employees and two City of Corvallis employees from public 
works, parole and probation, public affairs, public information, 
participated in EMI courses (ibid.).  In addition, the Key Informant 
also participated in numerous family preparedness seminars at EMI 
since 1990 (Key Informant interview, March 30, 1995).  In short, 
Benton County personnel and officials are taking advantage of OEM 
and EMI courses, while networking with other local, state, and 
federal emergency services personnel. 
Other than the financial and technical assistance of OEM and 
FEMA, disaster planning in Benton County incorporates an internal 
organizational structure.  There are several public, private, and 
volunteer groups in Benton County that participate in the process of 
disaster planning; however, two that significantly influence disaster 
planning are the Benton County's Office of Emergency Services and 
the Benton County Emergency Management Council. 105 
Benton County's Office of Emergency Services 
The Benton County sheriff is responsible for managing the 
Office of Emergency Services, as well as law enforcement and 
corrections (Sheriff interview, Sept.  1,  1994; March 26, 1995).  The 
current incumbent has been sheriff since 1989.  The Office of 
Emergency Services employs one full-time coordinator.  The 
Emergency Services Coordinator is responsible for providing: 
Coordination of emergency services for all natural and 
(hu)man-made disasters, including search and rescue 
operations, outdoor safety programs and hazardous 
materials incidents for all residents of Benton County 
(Benton County Budget, 1994, p. 73). 
In addition to coordinating disaster planning and response, the 
Emergency Services Coordinator also manages Benton County's 
Search and Rescue (SAR) program.  About 135 volunteers assist the 
coordinator with search and rescue, ham radio operators,  emergency 
services, and administrative duties (Emergency Services Coordinator 
interview, March 31,  1995). 
Figure 3 illustrates the relationships among the Emergency 
Services Coordinator, sheriff, and county commissioners.  For 
instance, the Coordinator is held accountable by the sheriff for 
maintaining the county's emergency management  program.  The 
three county commissioners, who are the chief executives of the 
county, also oversee his activities (Benton County Budget, FY 1994­
95, p. 28).  The commissioners, who serve three-year terms,  are 
responsible for ensuring that appropriate local policy is adopted "to 
promote health, safety, and welfare of county citizens" (Benton 
County Budget, FY 1994-95: 28-29). 106 
Figure 3: Organizational Chart for Emergency
Planning in Benton County (1994-95) 
Organizational Structure for Emergency Planning
in Benton County, Oregon (1994-1995) 
FEMAI The Public) 
County 
Region X 
(Commissioners) 
(  Sheriff  )  OEM 
(Emergency Service)_ 
NM MIR Coordinator 
22 Functional
 
Annexes
 
Public, Private, and
 
Volunteer Groups
 
Exercise 
Coordinate 107 
Benton County Emergency Management Council 
In April, 1991, Benton County Emergency Services 
Management Council was formed at the urging of a concerned citizen 
who later was appointed by the sheriff to be the chairperson (Key 
Informant).  The Council, which was renamed Benton County 
Emergency Management Council, is divided into two subcommittees: 
public education and operations (See Figure 3).  The former is 
responsible for increasing public awareness through educational 
activities, seminars, and community events, while the latter is 
charged with improving inter-agency coordination during 
emergencies by exercising SOPs during drills and simulations (These 
committees' activities will be described in the citizen involvement 
and outcome sections).  At this time, the Council meets every other 
month, with the public education and operations subcommittees 
meeting alternating months (Key Informant interview, July 8,  1994). 
The Emergency Services Coordinator described the value of 
having the Council: 
The Council is made up of city, county, and state public 
service agencies, educational systems, private industry, 
volunteer organizations, health care organizations, private 
citizens.  The goals of the council are to foster a sense of 
community and coordination in planning for both natural 
and (hu)man-made disasters and to strive for a systems 
approach to planning which ensures a traditional 
response to emergency events.  This would maximize 
effectiveness of combined public and private resources. 
Another goal is to educate the community in 72-hour 
preparedness for survival (Emergency Services 
Coordinator workplan notes,  1993). 108 
Many of the Council's members, such as local agency personnel, 
elected officials, private businesses, and volunteer organizations, are 
also involved with the re-writing of the emergency plan.  Some 
participate on one of the functional annexes, while others organize 
community outreach  activities. 
It is apparent that disaster planning continues to evolve in 
Benton County.  At the time of this study, two issues were being 
discussed.  First, members were discussing the possibility of 
restructuring the Council so that a policy board of community leaders 
would oversee five specific committees (Participant Observation, 
March 15, 1995).  (See Figure 4).  This would improve the 
accountability of the participants involved in re-writing the twenty-
two functional annexes, and generate more support on the part of 
elected officials and agency department heads. 
Secondly, the Council is considering how to organize 
neighborhoods and individuals in order to involve communities in 
disaster planning and to identify special needs and resources.  They 
are proposing the formation of neighborhood association emergency 
preparedness organizations.  Similar programs have been 
implemented already in Portland, Oregon Fire Bureau's Neighborhood 
Emergency Team (N.E.T.), and in California's Citizen Emergency 
Response Teams (CERT) (Key Informant interview, July 8, 1994; 
Participant Observation, Oct. 19, 1994).  The Key Informant met a 
consultant during a national training session at EMI who organized 
neighborhood emergency management programs in Santa Clara 
County, California, and Kitsap County, Washington.  The Council is 
now considering hiring the consultant to implement a similar Crq 
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neighborhood organization program in Benton County (Participant 
Observation, July 20, 1994, and Oct. 19, 1994).  This would be a new 
technique for Benton County to include more public input in planning 
and organize communities for disasters. 
Problem Identification 
The second element of the disaster planning process is problem 
identification.  One key question that guided the researcher's 
investigations was: How does Benton County define real or perceived 
disaster problems in order to plan for them?  In the past, Benton 
County had to comply with federal agency objectives and procedures 
for civil defense instead of all-hazards functional planning.  This 
section will describe two factors that have affected problem 
identification in Benton County: national security priorities and local 
needs; and FEMA Region X's support of community-based planning. 
National Security Priorities and Local Needs 
National security priorities were an obstacle to planning for 
many LEMAs previously.  For instance, FEMA emphasized national 
security issues.  This meant Benton County followed specific FEMA 
mandates for civil defense or nuclear attack-related planning. 
Waugh Jr. (1994) describes how focusing on nationally-defined 
problems affected state and local agencies: 
During the 1980s, in particular, FEMA suffered from poor 
leadership that resulted in very high turnover in 
personnel, legal charges against some political appointees 
and contractors, and a fluctuating set of programmatic 111 
emphases.  State and local officials often found 
themselves at odds with FEMA over resources and 
responsibilities and confused by the rapidly changing 
priorities.... this conflict characterized FEMA's operations 
in the 1980s, as well as the controversies concerning 
FEMA's authority and its organizational culture which 
were shaped by national security priorities (Waugh Jr., 
1994: 254). 
FEMA's emphasis on national security is changing.  Congress 
commissioned the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) and National 
Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to investigate FEMA 
following Hurricane Andrew in 1992 (Sylves, 1994, p. 303).  NAPA's 
final report (1994) concluded: "The time has come to shift the 
emphasis from national security to domestic emergency management 
using an all-hazards approach" (p. x; Sylves, 1994, p. 304).  In 1992, 
President Clinton appointed James Lee Witt as director of FEMA. 
While attending the OEM's 1994 annual meeting in Bend, Witt stated 
that FEMA intended to shift its priorities from nuclear attack 
planning to mitigation and disaster preparedness programs 
(Participation Observation, August 30, 1994).  This indicates that 
LEMAs, such as Benton County, could now focus on more threatening 
local concerns and issues other than civil defense.  Benton County has 
identified local problems by completing a hazard analysis. 
FEMA Region X Initiatives 
FEMA's regional offices also influence problem identification in 
Benton County. FEMA Region X office, which oversees state and local 
emergency management in Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Alaska, 112 
recently emphasized the importance of communities defining their 
own problems, and then designing a preparedness plan that meets 
their needs.  This means that planning would be centered on even 
lower levels than the county or local governmental level.  They 
propose that government shares responsibility and cooperative 
disaster response efforts with the public (FEMA Region X State and 
Local Assistance Planner interview, September 6, 1994 and January 
5,  1995). 
The initiative that FEMA Region X has been recently promoting 
is Community-Based Emergency Preparedness (CBEP).  It has 
encouraged Benton County to become a model for other communities 
to follow.  The FEMA Region X representative noted many resources 
already exist at the community level: 
Too often local government officials are not prepared to 
respond to major emergencies because they tend to rely 
only on the limited number of local government 
employees for response operations.  They tend to neglect 
significant resources in the leadership and expertise that 
exists throughout the community which can be involved 
in a community effort to respond to a local disaster. 
Local officials need to facilitate community involvement 
and provide primary leadership in developing and 
maintaining a community-based capability  (letter, August 
12,  1994) 
While FEMA Region X does not have legal authority to mandate 
community-based planning,  it  is  informally supporting emergency 
management programs at the community level by visiting Benton 
County.  For example, the State and Local Assistance Program 
Representative at Region X attended a Benton County Emergency 
Management Council meeting (November 16, 1994).  He also involved 113 
himself in educating and speaking to local emergency management 
leaders when he participated in a panel discussion, "Government 
Facing Disaster," at Oregon State University (November 17, 1994) 
with the Emergency Services Coordinator and Key Informant 
(Participation Observations, Nov. 16-17, 1994). 
Next, the Region X representative and a FEMA Region X 
Seismologist observed an Emergency Preparedness Seminar at 
Oregon State University which involved about 200 Linn-Benton 
county citizens (Participant Observation, April 10, 1995).  Both 
Region X representatives attended a preliminary meeting at the 
Benton County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) (Participant 
Observation, April 11, 1995).  They met with other county and city 
emergency officials, private business leaders, newspaper editor, Red 
Cross representative, the Key Informant, and OEM representative to 
discuss the possibility of applying for an earthquake mitigation grant 
(Participant Observation, April 11, 1995).  Visits to Benton County by 
Region X representatives translate into support for community-based 
planning.  It is evident from these meetings that FEMA Region X and 
Benton County have established a relationship, and they are pushing 
for a new planning approach. 
Leadership Approach 
The third process characteristic is the leadership style or 
approach.  In Benton County, many individuals could be identified as 
leaders involved with disaster planning, including elected officials 
(e.g.,  sheriff, county commissioners, and mayors), and department 
heads of city and county agencies.  Yet, it became apparent that 114 
elected officials and department agency heads are primarily
 
supporters of the leadership of two individuals: the Emergency 
Services Coordinator and the Key Informant.  This section proceeds to 
describe how leadership approach influences disaster planning in 
Benton County. 
After observing the incumbent Emergency Services Coordinator 
over a period of twelve months, it became evident that he was taking 
a proactive stance to disaster planning, when compared to his 
predecessor.  Rather than merely waiting for a disaster, as in the 
past, Benton County is now preparing for any type and any size 
disaster.  The coordinator stressed this point at a Council meeting, 
"It's not a question of 'if,' but 'when' something will happen. We 
must be prepared" (Participant Observation, Oct.  19, 1994). 
At this time, the Office of Emergency Services has only one 
person: the Emergency Services Coordinator.  He has involved 
volunteer and private groups, and encouraged citizens generally to 
join in decision making.  For instance, he has delegated disaster 
planning tasks by organizing planning committees to write the 
functional annexes to the SOP.  As seen previously in Table 12, many 
agencies have been involved in re-writing the county's emergency 
plan.  Not only does the Emergency Services Coordinator informally 
interact with committee members during Council meetings, 
emergency exercises, and drills, but he also works with other city 
and county agency personnel, such as law enforcement and fire 
protection, on a day-to-day basis (Participant Observation, March 15, 
1995; Interview, February 24, 1995).  The Emergency Services 
Coordinator cannot impose tight control on these groups, but he uses 115 
a "sharing" style compatible with this fact, being sure to involve
 
people in planning.  This networking in large part is what will be 
activated during disasters. 
The Emergency Services Coordinator himself describes his role 
as "a coach or facilitator for the commissioners and public safety 
department heads" (Interview, March 20, 1995).  Overall, he has 
accomplished three goals in this area: elected officials and 
department heads are now aware of their emergency management 
role, trust the coordinator, and take emergency preparedness more 
seriously (Participant Observations, October 19, 1994).  The main 
advantages of using this type of participative approach, he cited, is 
greater awareness by agency personnel and supervisors of their 
responsibilities, and to work through those tasks before a disaster 
(Emergency Services Coordinator, interview, July 7, 1994).  By 
including more people, Benton County hopes to be better prepared to 
react more swiftly, more effectively, and cut costs. 
In addition to involving others and delegating disaster planning 
responsibilities to others, the Emergency Services Coordinator 
cultivates communication and coordination among different 
government levels and organizations.  He follows FEMA's rules and 
regulations, and is knowledgeable about procedures.  He has 
completed FEMA's Professional Development Series courses organized 
by OEM. Through his networking at OEM, he has taught several 
training courses, including Community-Based Emergency Planning 
(Participant Observation, May 17, 1994).  Moreover, he is 
approachable through an "open door" policy.  To further raise public 
awareness, he regularly gives presentations to local civic 116 
organizations.  He allowed the author access to his files and meetings 
for the current research.  The files included minutes of previous 
Council meetings, and OEM quarterly workplan reports. 
Lastly, his leadership approach has been regarded as a model 
for other county emergency coordinators.  For instance, he is an 
active member of the Oregon Emergency Management Agency 
(OEMA), an independent association for those involved in emergency 
management.  He was awarded the "1994 Outstanding Emergency 
Program Manager  Urban" at OEMA's annual meeting in Bend 
(Participant Observation, August 30, 1994), and elected president of 
OEMA in 1995-96 (Participant Observation, February 6,  1995). 
During his two-year tenure, his accomplishments have been 
recognized favorably by many, including the Key Informant, a 
Benton County citizen activist.  His participative and open leadership 
style has allowed the community approach to work better. 
The Key Informant has also emerged in a citizen emergency 
preparedness leadership role in Benton County.  Her leadership 
approach is best described by three components: (1) creating a 
vision, (2) promoting that vision, and (3) networking to achieve that 
vision.  First, the Key Informant has a developed a clear vision of her 
goal, namely community-wide emergency preparedness (interview, 
July 8, 1994).  She has taken the effort to become educated and 
informed about emergency preparedness.  As the chairperson of the 
Benton County Emergency Management Council, she significantly 
influences the group's agenda (Key Informant interview, July 8, 
1994; Participant Observations, Jan.  18, 1995).  Secondly, where 
many citizens voice concern but do not act, the Key Informant 117 
communicates her enthusiasm to community leaders and others at 
Council meetings and Emergency Preparedness Seminars (Participant 
Observations, April 10, and 20, 1995).  At these public events, the 
Key Informant shares personal stories to motivate individuals, 
families, volunteer groups, and neighborhoods to prepare for 
disasters.  Third, the Key Informant has learned from previous 
experiences how to operate and network within the political and 
bureaucratic environment to benefit her local community (interview, 
July 8, 1994).  Her involvement will be described further in the next 
section. 
Citizen Involvement 
Citizen involvement has been one of the central topics 
throughout this study.  The researcher found three aspects of citizen 
involvement evident in Benton County's planning process: (1) 
community coalitions, (2) officials sharing responsibility with public, 
private, and volunteer groups, (3) and educational programs for 
citizens. 
According to the literature, one prevalent obstacle for disaster 
planning has been an apathetic public (Rossi, Wright, and Weber-
Burdin, 1982).  The Sheriff commented on difficulties with low public 
support before disasters, and high expectations of government when 
disaster strikes.  He said: 
People expect someone to come in and save the day.  We 
try to get the public informed with preparedness 
activities.  You're not going to get all of them.  It takes 
responsibility on the people's part.  I think we are sort of 118 
on that track.  We have come a long way say, from 4-5 
years ago.  It's going to take some time (Sheriff interview, 
Sept.  1, 1994). 
The Sheriff's comments reflect one perspective on disaster 
planning.  But Benton County residents view disaster risks more or 
less urgently.  For example, the Key Informant's motivation for 
promoting emergency preparedness stems from her church's 
influences.  She said: 
The recommendation from our church is that you ought 
to store a year's supply of food and clothing. There are 
probably lots of people in our church who don't, there are 
lots of people who do (Key Informant interview, July 8, 
1994). 
Benton County officials said they have been fortunate to have 
an activist in the community.  As mentioned in the organizational 
structure, the Key Informant was fundamental in creating the Benton 
County Emergency Management Council.  Now, that Council is trying 
to convince public, private, and volunteer groups to share the 
responsibility of emergency preparedness by pursuing a proactive 
community outreach program.  For instance, the Council's public 
educational subcommittee seeks to provide knowledge and training 
for individuals, families, businesses, and neighborhoods to become 
self-sufficient during disasters.  In an interview, the Benton County 
Sheriff said: 119 
We need to get out and involve the community and 
engage them on an educational basis so that they can 
hold their own and make them understand that we can't 
be all things to all people in the middle of a disaster. 
They're going to have to depend upon themselves and 
they're going to have to depend upon their neighbors 
(Sheriff interview, Sept.  1,  1994). 
Since its formation in April of 1991, the Council has developed 
several community outreach programs to inform the community 
about disaster planning.  For instance, the Council's public 
educational subcommittee, headed by a Benton County extension 
agent, organized an Earthquake Preparedness Seminar at Oregon 
State University on April 26, 1994 (Participant Observation, April 26, 
1994).  Over 600 people attended (Gazette-Times, April 27, 1994: 
A2).  The purpose of this event was to inform the public about 
seismic hazards.  There were three 45-minute break-out sessions in 
medium-sized classrooms (about 75 people) in which representatives 
from FEMA, OEM, private insurance, American Red Cross, Benton 
County Emergency Services, fire and law enforcement described their 
roles and responsibilities, and answered the audience's questions. 
Furthermore, independent vendors displayed emergency-related 
services and products such as homeowner insurance and first aid 
kits, in addition to educating local residents how to use a fire 
extinguisher, secure water heaters, and turn off gaslines. 
The Benton County extension agent developed a survey to 
gather data from the seminar, and reported the results to a Council 
meeting.  First, the survey found that knowledge about earthquakes 
and emergency preparedness was increased because of this seminar. 120 
Second, the participants found the two keynote speakers, a geologist 
and an engineer from OSU, and breakout sessions were informative. 
Third, that people would attend next year if given new information 
(Participant Observation, July 29, 1994). 
The following year, the Council's public educational 
subcommittee organized two emergency preparedness seminars 
again at the OSU campus (Participant Observation, April 10 and 20, 
1995).  Officials from state, federal, and local levels attended.  The 
goal of the seminars was to inform the public about community risks, 
and how to be prepared for an earthquake (Public Education 
subcommittee's press release,  March 23, 1995).  Vendors also 
attended the seminars. 
A survey was distributed to gather information about possibly 
organizing a pilot project for a neighborhood association emergency 
preparedness organizations, like Portland's Neighborhood Emergency 
Team (N.E.T.), and California's Citizen Emergency Response Teams 
(CERT) (Appendix D).  The results of the survey have not yet been 
tabulated; however the Council is considering neighborhood 
association emergency preparedness organizations as one method for 
the increased public involvement in disaster planning.  Ideally, 
neighborhoods and individuals would be organized so that they can 
identify special needs and resources (Key Informant interview, July 
8, 1994; Participant Observation, April 10, 1995). 
Other activities that the Council's educational subcommittee 
organized was an interactive county fair booth with the theme, "Don't 
Gamble With your life, Be prepared"  August 2-7, 1994 (Participant 
Observation, August 2,  1994).  Council members and other volunteers 121 
who staffed the booth, and informally interacted with fairgoers, 
especially children.  They distributed Red Cross literature, such as an 
emergency supplies checklist for families.  They also offered games 
to test basic knowledge of emergency preparedness and local 
hazards.  They gave out balloons with the Benton County Emergency 
Management Council slogan, "Are you ready?"  Several local 
businesses donated prizes at the event. 
FEMA and the American Red Cross have teamed up to create an 
educational packet, "Family Preparedness Program," which includes 
videos (i.e. "Disaster Dudes") pamphlets, and additional informational 
materials.  The American Red Cross chapter for Linn-Benton County 
is located in Albany, and has an office in Corvallis.  It reported that 
"over 30,000 copies of disaster services materials have been 
distributed in the past 18 months" (Participant Observation, March, 
30, 1995).  The chapter offers several disaster services courses, as 
well as first aid and CPR.  Some Red Cross volunteers from Linn-
Benton counties completed specialized training in resource 
management, damage assessment, mental health, and shelter 
management.  They served during presidential-declared disasters, 
such as the Midwestern Floods and Northridge Earthquake 
(Participant Observation, October 19, 1994).  This exposes these 
citizens to the importance of pre-disaster preparedness activities 
that the Council encourages. 
In addition to sharing and planning community educational 
activities among volunteer groups, the Council is including private 
businesses in community preparedness programs.  The American Red 
Cross and FEMA have designed an emergency preparedness guide for 122 
business and industry.  The Key Informant gave a copy to the new 
Chamber of Commerce director.  She is engaged in emergency 
preparedness presentations to business and industry (Participant 
Observation, Oct. 19, 1994).  By including local businesses in this 
process, resources are identified before a disaster, and contracts are 
pre-arranged.  Furthermore, some businesses are investigating 
installing generators for alternate power sources, so they may be 
able to operate following an emergency, thus reducing a probable 
business  disaster. 
The Council's public educational subcommittee and other 
members also plan more intensive community efforts in the future. 
During a follow-up interview with the Key Informant who started 
this broad-based interest in emergency preparedness, she said that 
she expected there will be more community preparedness activities 
in Benton County.  Many, including the Sheriff, support continuation 
of similar activities as long as there are resources.  For example, 
when asked what he would want to see happen if he was given $1 
million for anything, the sheriff responded: 
I would like to spend the money on the community, doing 
fairs, training for preparedness for any type of disaster, 
(wind storms, fire, earthquake) public affairs type of 
work so that people felt as though it wasn't just public 
safety that is going to come in and save the day (Sheriff 
interview, Sept.  1,  1994). 
Community outreach events organized by the Benton County 
Emergency Management Council are the primary intervention to 123 
encourage citizens to become educated about disasters.  They have 
generated support both in public and private sectors of Benton 
County. 
Role of Experts 
In Benton County, experts aid in the process of disaster 
planning in three general areas: hazard analysis, training, and public 
education.  First, the Emergency Services Coordinator relied on 
previous studies that were conducted by experts when he 
formulated the county's hazards analysis.  For example, in 1987, the 
Army Corps of Engineers provided data for flood inundation maps, 
and estimated flood elevations and arrival times in case one of five 
dams near Benton County failed.  Similarly, in 1986, FEMA conducted 
a flood insurance and hazard study of Benton County which was used 
to identify the 100-year floodplain and floodway general locations. 
Next, in 1991, the Oregon Department of Forestry conducted a study 
on wildland fire risks for forested areas of western Benton County. 
These three examples of state and federal agency studies provide 
invaluable information for emergency personnel, such as public 
works and fire officials in Benton County. 
The second disaster planning aspect for utilizing experts is 
evident when consultants visit Benton County to update emergency 
personnel with advanced training.  The Council has invited several 
guest experts, such as an urban search and rescue specialist from 
Florida.  He made a presentation at a Council meetings, in addition to 
providing training for various fire officials (Participant Observation, 
October 19, 1994).  This contact was made by the Key Informant 124 
while networking at national emergency management functions at 
EMI.  The only expense for this expert's training was the airplane 
ticket; he used his vacation time and stayed with the Key Informant's 
family.  This is a good example of using alternative methods to gain 
expert information without expending large amounts of resources. 
Public education is the third part that experts play in disaster 
planning in Benton County.  It is challenging for experts to reach the 
public with hazard information.  Following the Scotts Mills 
earthquake in March of 1993, however, many people were concerned 
about the possibility of future seismic risks in their community.  The 
Council was able to take advantage of geologic and engineering 
experts at Oregon State University, which is located in Corvallis, the 
heart of Benton County.  For instance, OSU geologists have explained 
and translated scientific information at a Council meeting (Participant 
Observation, April 26, 1994).  An OSU structural engineer discussed 
the effects of Kobe, Japan earthquake in a public session (Participant 
Observation, April 5, 1995).  While it may be difficult for the 
community to understand hazard risks and get involved in disaster 
preparedness, experts have played a significant role in aiding with 
hazard analysis, training, and public awareness. 
Lastly, it is important to explain that the Key Informant has 
become an expert herself.  Indeed, sometimes citizens may become 
experts through experience and training in a specific field (Hadden, 
1989: 207).  This was evident with the Key Informant, who was 
invited to participate on an year-long policy advisory committee for 
the U.S. Congress Office of Technology and Assessment (1994-95) 
(Key Informant interview, March 30, 1995).  This subcommittee, a 125 
select group of scientists, engineers, and a public education specialist, 
provide policy options for how legislators spend $1 million 
earthquake mitigation block from National Earthquake Hazard 
Reduction Program (NEHRP) funding (ibid.).  Thus, the Key Informant 
has been recognized as an expert, which is unique because disaster 
planning has become more technical in nature due to advances in 
technology and its application to hazard management.  One 
advantage is that she is closer to the locus of decision making. 
However, there are some drawbacks: it takes a considerable amount 
of time and effort for one member to have much impact on decisions. 
Outcomes of Planning 
OEM and FEMA require Benton County to have a disaster plan. 
Benton County is in the process of re-writing its EOP, which has thus 
far taken 16 months.  Because the final document is not yet 
completed, it could be said that it has not met the outcome goal.  In 
Benton County, the outcome of disaster planning has focused on more 
than just re-writing and exercising their EOP.  For instance, the 
Emergency Services Coordinator is facilitating coordination and 
collaboration efforts so that individuals continue to develop informal 
networks and maintain open communications as they complete 
functional annexes.  Likewise, the Key Informant has been 
instrumental in establishing a community coalition which has, in 
turn, organized several community outreach programs and practiced 
emergency procedures during drills.  Thus, Benton County has not 
been focusing on the EOP as the end product for disaster planning, 
they have been nurturing a continuous planning process (Quarantelli, 126 
1988).  At this stage, Benton County is far from reaching all areas of 
the community.  Officials try to reach a broader section of the 
community; however, gaining community support for emergency 
preparedness still remains to be an obstacle. 
How does Benton Co. measure against the models? 
From the information gathered during interviews, documents, 
and participant observations, these six characteristics provide a 
framework for analyzing Benton County's approach to disaster 
planning.  Chapter 5 described two disaster planning models: 
Traditional Emergency Management System (TEMS) and the 
Community-Based Emergency Preparedness (CBEP).  It is evident 
that Benton County is trying to implement the community-based 
approach, but several aspects point to the fact that they are still 
using TEMS approach. 
The CBEP approach is difficult to implement for several 
reasons.  First, Benton County must operate within hierarchical, 
bureaucratic, and formal systems that make planning complicated 
and troublesome.  Disaster planning becomes complicated as local 
agencies try to coordinate with other federal, state, private and 
volunteer organizations.  Since the Fall of 1994, however, Benton 
County has been getting informal support from FEMA's Region X 
offices for implementing the CBEP approach. FEMA Region X 
representatives wish to share disaster planning and response tasks, 
and organize planning at the community level. 
Benton County has made some progressed towards community-
based planning.  For instance, they no longer have an EOP that solely 127 
emphasizes national security issues.  Instead, the Emergency Services 
Coordinator has directed the EOP revision process with a 
participative leadership approach.  He has developed a framework in 
which public, private, and volunteer organizations may be involved 
in the planning process.  Moreover, these groups have become 
stakeholders and have ownership in a community preparedness 
program.  The Emergency Services Coordinator delegates disaster 
responsibilities which illustrates that Benton County is developing 
more than just an EOP.  More individuals and agencies have been 
involved during the process of writing Benton County's emergency 
plan; participants are establishing active networks, communicating 
about their roles, and assuming responsibility for disaster.  This is 
quite different from the past when the plan sat on a shelf collecting 
dust.  Still, Benton County has only begun this process that the entire 
community can agree upon. 
Benton County Emergency Management Council has been the 
vehicle for these groups to get involved.  It was formed when a 
citizen turned activist/expert shared her vision of emergency 
preparedness with others.  That vision has been transformed into a 
legitimate community coalition, the Benton County Emergency 
Management Council.  While this group tries to share disaster 
preparedness information through public educational programs, they 
are unsuccessful in reaching everyone.  Unless people perceive there 
is a risk, they tend to ignore that a disaster will take place 
(Quarantelli, 1988).  Participants rely on experts to translate risks so 
they might better understand potential hazard mapping. 128 
Previously, the public was not included in disaster planning. 
After a citizen began to question the county's emergency capability, 
she became educated in emergency preparedness.  This was not a 
easy task.  She confronted a closed environment that assumed that 
the public was unable to understand sophisticated disaster planning 
procedures.  Hence, the public had been trained to be apathetic. 
Additionally, after several devastating and costly disasters in 
the United States, the lead agency in emergency management, FEMA, 
has had a difficult task of educating the public to become prepared. 
Since the 1950s, people have grown to have high expectations for 
government to bail them out during times of disasters.  One major 
implication is people have little incentive to organize their family, 
neighborhood, or workplace for future disasters. 
In Benton County, The Emergency Services Coordinator and Key 
Informant have taken a proactive stance involving the community. 
They recognized that this is a long process that requires continuous 
updating and meeting to exchange information. they try to promote 
team work, and bottom-up approach to disaster planning.  In this 
way, the organizational structure of disaster planning in Benton 
County is horizontal, relies on networking and informal 
arrangements.  This is also evident in the relationship between the 
Council and coordinator's functional annexes assignments which is 
similar to the CBEP approach.  Such examples have brought Benton 
County closer to implementing the CBEP approach.  However, disaster 
preparedness has not taken hold.  This chapter described how the 
Emergency Services Coordinator and Key Informant have favored 
moving toward the CBEP model to include more people in the 129 
planning process.  However, involving citizens is time-consuming 
because more people make it more difficult to agree on common 
goals and means to carry out those objectives. 
This case study also examined previous activities that Benton 
County is currently implementing to involve the community in 
disaster planning.  It outlined twelve potential hazards which Benton 
County has identified.  Table 14 summarizes Benton County's disaster 
planning process by looking at six characteristics.  It illustrates the 
complexity of categorizing a system that is in the midst of change. 
Therefore, one outcome for disaster planning is that a minority 
of Benton County citizens have been educated about their role and 
responsibilities before and during a disaster.  It is preliminary to 
suggest that Benton County has become a model for a different 
approach to disaster planning that is community-based.  It  is evident 
that Benton County's disaster planning process is  still emerging. 130 
Table 14: Process of Disaster Planning in Benton County (1994-95)
 
Process 
Charact­
eristics 
Organizational
Structure 
Problem
 
Definition
 
Leadership

Approach
 
Citizen
 
Involvement
 
Role  of 
experts 
Outcomes  of
 
Planning
 
Traditional 
Emergency 
Management 
System  (TEMS) 
Hierarchical 
Formal 
Mandates 
Rules  and 
Regulations 
Duplicated 
functions 
Rational 
Formal  agreements 
Uniform problems 
identified  by 
FEMA /OEM 
Top-down 
Directive 
Tight Control 
Reactive 
Officials direct 
public  activity 
Passive 
High  expectations 
of government 
Short  memories 
Must  re-learn 
Experts  are  central 
People  have 
minimal  role 
Decisions made by 
policymakers 
Risk  assessment 
based on science 
Little  collaboration 
among  experts 
Product-oriented
 
(A Plan)
 
"Quick fix"
 
Community-
Based  Emergency
Preparedness 
(CBEP) 
Networking 
Loose-coupling 
Informal 
Discretionary 
Behavior 
Shared 
Governance 
Intra­
organizational 
Flexible 
Local problems are 
indicators  of 
community  needs 
Local values 
considered 
Bottom-up 
Facilitative 
Preventive 
Proactive 
Officials  share 
responsibility 
during  disasters 
Establish  coalitions 
People take 
responsibility  for 
themselves 
Stakeholders 
Experts  translate 
risks to public so 
they  can 
understand  and 
make  decisions 
Risk  assessment 
influenced  by 
community  values 
Experts work 
together 
Process-oriented 
(Community­
development) 
Long-term 
commitment 
Continuous 
process 
Benton  County 
FEMA/OEM requires local 
tasks  before funding 
granted 
Many resources  are top-
down 
Networking  during 
preparedness,  training & 
planning  phases 
Planning Committees' 
Structure  is  horizontal 
with  re-writing  plan 
More people involved  in 
planning  process 
FEMA-imposed mandates 
Sets  local programs 
Hazard  identification  using 
FEMA matrices 
Coordinator  takes 
proactive  approach 
Others  included  in 
decision-making 
Delegates  tasks 
People  rely  on government 
People "too busy" for pre-
disaster  planning 
Public  support and 
awareness  low 
Council formed at urging 
of concerned citizen 
(bottom-up) 
Assesses risks 
Public has minimal input 
Experts  provide 
educational  seminars 
People  acknowledge 
uncertainty 
Assesses  disaster 
preparedness by having  a 
plan  in  place 
Few  know about plan 
Information  outdated  or 
inaccurate 
More people  involved 131 
CHAPTER 7
 
THESIS CONCLUSIONS AND
 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
 
This case study has focused on how Benton County introduced 
and is currently implementing a new planning approach called 
Community-Based Emergency Preparedness (CBEP).  However, 
involving private, public, and volunteer groups in the process of 
disaster planning has been difficult.  Since the formation of the 
Benton County Emergency Management Council, public support and 
community involvement in disaster preparedness has grown through 
activities such as bi-monthly meetings, public forums, seminars, 
training, and exercises.  Yet, it appears that Benton County is on the 
path to a transformed process of planning and preparing for future 
disasters.  It has yet to realize the importance of involving all aspects 
of the community  in order to reduce costs and damage of hazards. 
As a new planning approach is implemented, however, it can be 
expected to reveal its own limitations and flaws.  It has proceeded 
far enough in Benton County to indicate successes and limits of its 
Community-Based Emergency Preparedness CBEP approach, though 
the real test is how it works during a disaster. 
From the information gathered through interviews, documents, 
and participant observations, this chapter draws seven conclusions 
and suggests several recommendations for future research. 
1.  In Benton County, disaster planning is in transition to a new 
community-based system and exhibits aspects from a more 132 
Traditional System of officials monopolizing the process and the 
community has little knowledge of contingency plans. 
Benton County has adopted several practices, including 
organizational structure, problem identification, leadership approach, 
citizen participation, role of experts, and outcome.  For instance, the 
Benton County Emergency Services Coordinator undertook CBEP 
strategies by delegating disaster tasks among various city/county 
personnel, private businesses, and volunteer organizations.  They 
were assigned to re-write the county's emergency plan.  The process 
has taken longer than anticipated for several reasons.  Members of 
the various functional annex committees have more pressing tasks 
than to plan, prepare, and exercise for a disaster that are 
unpredictable.  Supervisors of committee members from local 
agencies may have initially supported disaster planning efforts, yet 
did not schedule time to complete the tasks.  Thus, disaster planning 
competes with day-to-day tasks and depends on commitment and 
follow-through of functional annex committee members and their 
supervisors.  Future research might pinpoint other aspects that 
complicate disaster planning such as public apathy, low political 
importance, and uncertainty of disasters. 
2.  Benton County's internal organizational structure for 
disaster planning is heterogeneous, informal, and relies on 
networking strategies, while its external organizational structure is 
formal, bureaucratic, and hierarchical. 
This case study examined, in part, FEMA' s evolving role with 
other federal agencies, state and local governments, and volunteer 133 
and private groups.  It also provides a glimpse into the complexities 
surrounding external and internal organizational structures in 
disaster planning.  This thesis confirms Schneider's (1992) premise 
that state and local governments are constrained by FEMA's 
bureaucratic politics and emergent norms during disasters.  As FEMA 
tries to redefine its role and improve its track record, local and state 
agencies are caught in the middle. 
At this time, FEMA and OEM provide Benton County with 
financial and technical assistance.  Additionally, FEMA Region X 
officials are informally supporting CBEP.  Benton County attempts to 
implement the CBEP approach by identifying and utilizing 
community resources to improve accountability, save money, serve 
people, solve problems, and be more flexible before, during, and 
following disasters.  Benton County emphasizes early intervention 
and a proactive stance in planning. 
Future research may focus on aspects of organizational 
structure, such as power conflicts among various levels of 
government and agencies.  This has been a difficulty targeted in the 
literature and an area Benton County has worked on.  Further studies 
may also concentrate on the possibility of forming neighborhood 
emergency preparedness associations.  It would be beneficial to 
study how these neighborhood groups can be maintained to remain 
effective. 
3.  Benton County identifies problems from the bottom up. 
This case study traced FEMA Region X's initial efforts to 
facilitate planning, preparedness and mitigation strategies  at the 134 
community level in order to reduce federal disaster assistance (FEMA
 
Region X State and Local Assistance Planner interview, Nov. 17, 1994 
and January 5, 1995).  Benton County has defined twelve hazards 
and ranked them according to potential risk by following FEMA's 
Hazard Analysis Matrices. 
Future research may examine how FEMA monitors and holds 
state and local emergency agencies accountable for pre-disaster 
planning and preparedness activities.  Future research may also 
investigate how organizations perform when they are stakeholders, 
or "buy into" problem identification.  Future research might examine 
how emergency agencies implement planning approaches when 
identified problems conflict with other agencies' priorities, such as 
FEMA's divided emphasis on nuclear attack planning with mitigation 
and preparedness programs. 
4.  Participatory leaders, such as the Key Informant and Benton 
County Emergency Services Coordinator, motivate their community 
by sharing a vision of disaster preparedness. 
This case study found that local emergency management 
agencies that have active coordinators appear to be well-prepared 
for unanticipated disasters.  This supports Foster's (1980) argument 
that to have an effective program, coordinators "must have sufficient 
stature in public service and the community to command the respect 
and obtain the cooperation of those with whom he (she) will deal" (p. 
7).  In Benton County, there are two individuals who have central 
leadership roles in disaster planning.  First, the Emergency Services 
Coordinator is a participative leader who considers others' opinions, 135 
and has delegated tasks to others in re-writing the emergency plan.
 
In this way, emergency personnel, school district representatives, 
hospital officials, businesses, and others are better informed of their 
responsibilities and discuss how to accomplish those tasks prior to 
disasters. 
Secondly, the Key Informant has become an expert in 
emergency preparedness, and has influenced elected officials and 
community leaders to take preparedness more seriously before 
disasters occurs.  She has accomplished this through networking and 
by organizing informal community meetings and seminars. 
Future research might look at what experience, skills, and 
leadership potential are needed for an effective emergency services 
coordinator.  Resources currently available to develop effective 
coordinators should be identified. 
5.  Citizens are informed of community risks through public 
educational programs and training seminars organized by the 
Council. 
In Benton County, one concerned citizen organized the 
community process of disaster planning almost single-handedly  She 
talked county officials into forming the Benton County Emergency 
Management Council, which combines private and public 
organizations.  However, one individual cannot do all the planning. 
It is evident that Benton County is involving the community in 
disaster planning in two ways: (1) informing citizens about disaster 
preparedness through educational and training programs; and (2) 
coordinating interagency disaster response through exercises and 136 
drills.  This involves a great deal of commitment, however, on the 
part of the participants and is time-consuming.  The Council is getting 
the message out about emergency preparedness through public 
service announcements, in addition to organizing meetings and 
seminars.  Likewise, emergency services personnel are practicing 
with simulated drills and exercises.  At these events, people share 
information at the grass-roots level.  This creates strong support-
building and incorporates public involvement in the process of 
disaster planning. 
Future research may look at needed representation on the 
Council and effective ways to organize community involvement. 
Some argue much of the population is not included in the 
membership of these associations.  Consequently, disaster planning 
may not be completely representative of the population. 
6.  Experts are utilized to identify hazards, and for translating 
risks to the public through hazard maps. 
Since the emphasis is on getting the community involved in 
disaster planning, it  is important that experts provide information in 
a form that is useful for "fostering, reinforcing and supplementing 
individual and local initiatives in an effective way" (Morren Jr., 1983: 
286).  Future research could explore the most effective ways of doing 
this.  More study is needed on when the public takes risks seriously. 
differences in experts' risk assessment and lay people's risk 
perceptions, and how they motivate or hinder local policies, such as 
land use and building codes requirements. 137 
Research in the future can analyze the usefulness to public 
edification of technologies, such as Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS).  At this time, Benton County Public Works is starting to 
develop a county-wide GIS to store vast amounts of data,  but its use 
is too limited and insufficient to provide a basis for any conclusions. 
Future research may look at implementing a hazard mapping project 
using GIS, and subsequently, exhibiting maps at the public library or 
publishing them in the yellow pages. 
7.  The outcome of disaster planning is an on-going process 
requiring continued public support, the commitment of elected 
officials, and periodic updating of information and resources. 
Heydebrand (1977) describes two types of outcomes: "The first 
is products, artifacts, or constructs, while the second are the 
activities" (in Hall, 1991: 30).  In other words, the process of disaster 
planning is itself the outcome, which is dynamic.  Rather than relying 
on a written plan, Benton County is trying to put together a program 
that resembles Quarantelli's (1985) model.  Activities such as public 
education and training to build networks that constitutes maintaining 
a dynamic planning process (p. 5). 
This thesis has only described the outcomes.  But future 
research is needed on comparing input factors with planning outputs 
and then damage outcomes.  The outcome of disaster planning, such 
as economic factors, the media, the nature of community outreach 
activities, and rural emergency preparedness organizational 
structure and what factors are requisite to better outcomes.  Taken 
together, there are many activities underway pointing to an 138 
integrated people-oriented, efficient approach to future disaster.  The 
practical side of disaster research is showing improvement.  It would 
be useful to continue tracking disaster planning in Benton County so 
others may learn from its experiences. 139 
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Benton County Emergency Services Management Council 
Vision  Statement 
The Benton County Emergency Services Management Council 
and the citizens of the mid-Willamette Valley celebrate our 
outstanding success in planning and preparing for natural and 
(hu)man-made disasters.  The concept of "our" problem, "our" plan, 
"our" solution has fostered a sense of community and cooperation 
that serves as a model to other areas of public policy formulation 
The issue of emergency response is viewed as a total system 
that recognizes the inter-relationship and importance of each and 
every part.  All decisions and actions are on behalf of the citizens and 
their needs with no regard for political or jurisdictional boundaries. 
This systems approach to planning ensures an integrated response to 
emergency events which maximizes the effectiveness of the 
combined public and private resources.  Clear concise lines of 
authority have been established in our plans to cover all known 
threats; our numerous drills and exercises have tested these 
relationships and they have proven extremely effective. 
The success of our program is directly attributable to the solid 
financial support we have received from a number of sources. 
Federal, state, and local governments have recognized the magnitude 
of the growing threat of hazardous materials and other (hu)man­
made disasters in our communities, as well as the continuing danger 
posed by natural hazards.  This growing awareness has been 
translated into significant investment in emergency services/public 
safety infrastructure and readiness.  Oregon State University and 
private industry are also full partners in our campaign.  OSU and 
local businesses, both large and small, have taken active role sin all 
aspects of emergency preparedness, generously supporting the 
program with either monetary grants, facilities,  services, and/or 
professional  expertise. 
The key to our preparedness is an aggressive 72-hour family 
preparedness program that provides instruction to  all segments of 
our society from pre-schoolers to senior citizens.  The cornerstone of 149 
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the program is active public participation through established 
neighborhood groups, with neighbors helping neighbors.  Citizens are 
repeatedly reminded of the importance of preparedness and self-
reliance through awareness education presentations in the schools, 
professional and social groups, employee training and through media 
public service announcements.  Significant effort has also been given 
to preparing the families of our emergency responders so that these 
trained professionals can focus on their job with the knowledge that 
their loved ones are secure in a time of crisis. 
Community preparedness is richly enhanced by the highly 
motivated, well-trained personnel in our response agencies.  In 
every case their training surpasses the state accreditation standard. 
The responders regularly exercise their capabilities through formal 
and informal events; the exercises involve volunteers, local citizens, 
as well as state and federal agencies.  Mutual aid agreements exist as 
only a formal reminder of our inter-reliance and commitment to 
mutual cooperation and success. 150 
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Chronology of Interviews and Participant Observations
 
Dates 
April  7  Benton Co. Emergency Services 
Coordinator 
April  13-15 
April  22 
April  26 
April  27	  Benton Co. Emergency Services 
Coordinator 
May 16-20 
May 18 
May 24	  O.S.U. researcher, Coastal Hazards 
June 8	  Benton Co. Emergency Services 
Coordinator 
July 7	  Benton Co. Emergency Services 
Coordinator 
July  8	  Benton Co. Citizen Activist in 
Emergency  Preparedness 
July 20	  O.S.U. Extension Agent, Emergency 
Preparedness and Public 
Education 
Aug. 6 
Aug. 11	  Benton Co. Emergency Services 
Coordinator 
Aug. 24 
Aug. 29-31	  Keynote speaker, James Lee Witt, 
Director of FEMA 
Sept.  1	  Benton Co. Sheriff 
Sept.  6	  FEMA Region X State and Local 
Assistance Program 
Representative, Bothell, Wash. 
Sept. 8  Benton Co. Emergency Services 
Coordinator 
Sept. 15 
Part cipant	  Obtery 
Statewide Exercise: Quake-X 
`94 
Benton Co. Commissioner's 
meeting 
Earthquake  Preparedness 
Seminar (O.S.U.) 
FEMA Professional 
Development Series Disaster 
Planning Course (Salem) 
Benton Co. Emergency 
Management Council meeting 
Benton Co. Emergency 
Management Council education 
subcommittee meeting 
Benton Co. Fair, Emergency 
Services Booth 
Benton Co. Emergency 
Management Council meeting 
Oregon Emergency 
Management's Annual Meeting 
(Bend) 
Benton Co. Emergency 
Management Council education 
subcommittee meeting 151 
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Date 
Oct. 4 
ter  s 
Benton Co. Citizen Activist in 
Emergency Preparedness 
Oct. 6 
Oct. 6 
Oct. 10 
Oct. 12 
Oct. 13 
Oct. 19 
Benton Co. Fire Marshall, 
Hazardous Waste site  locations 
Philomath Rural Fire Protection 
District,  Fire Marshall 
Benton Co. Public Works, systems 
engineer 
O.S.U. professor, Geology 
O.S.U. professor, Geography 
Oct. 24 
Oct. 26 
Nov. 12 
Corvallis Fire Dept. official 
Benton Co. Emergency Services 
Coordinator (about FEMA Region X 
Mitigation Forum, Seattle) 
Nov. 14 
Nov. 16 
Nov. 17 
Nov. 28 
Dec. 17 
O.S.U.  professor,  structural 
engineering 
FEMA Region X State and Local 
Governments  representative 
(Corvallis) 
FEMA Region X State and Local 
Governments  representative 
(Corvallis) 
Oregon State Dept. of Forestry, 
Fire  Protection  representative 
Jan. 5 
Jan  12-15 
FEMA Region X, State and Local 
Governments Representative, 
Bothell, Wash. 
Jan.  18 
Jan.  18 
Feb. 6 
Benton Co. Emergency Services 
Coordinator 
Oregon Emergency Management 
Agency's Quarterly Meeting 
(Insurance Reform) 
Participant  Observatio 
Tsunami hazard warning off 
Oregon Coast (Oregon 
Emergency Management 
Agency) 
Benton Co. Emergency 
Management Council meeting 
Tour, Corvallis Sewage 
Treatment Plant 
Benton Co. Emergency 
Management Council Meeting 
O.S.U. Panel Discussion, 
"Government Facing Disaster" 
Evaluation of Exercise: 
"Violence in the Workplace" 
Benton Co. Emergency Services 
and Public Works response to 
flooding 
Benton Co. Emergency 
Management Council Meeting 152 
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Dates  Interviews 
Feb. 24  Benton Co. Emergency Services 
Coordinator 
March 7	  FEMA Region X, State and Local 
Governments Represenative, 
Bothell, Wash. 
March 15 
March 20	  Benton Co. Emergency Services 
Coordinator 
March 23  OEM Population Protection Planner 
March 30  Benton County Sheriff 
March 30  Key Informant 
March 31	  Benton Co. Emergency Services 
Coordinator 
April 3  Utilities  Spokesperson, Albany 
April 4  OSU Radiation Safety Office 
spokesperson 
April  5 
April  10 
April  11  FEMA Region X, State and Local 
Governments Represenative, OSU 
April 20 
Participant	  Observations 
Benton Co. Emergency 
Management Council meeting; 
Guest presentation made by 
author 
Benton County Emergency 
Management Council Education 
Subcommittee Meeting 
Benton Co. Emergency 
Management Council sponsored 
Kobe Earthquake Presentation 
at OSU 
Benton Co. Emergency 
Management Council sponsored 
Earthquake  Preparedness 
Seminar 
Benton Co. Emergency 
Management Council sponsored 
Earthquake  Preparedness 
Seminar 153 
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Sources of Data Collection for Benton Co. Case Study 
Characteristics
 
Organizational

Structure 
Problem 
Identification 
Semi-
Structured 
Interviews 
Benton Co. 
Emergency 
Services  (Sheriff 
and  Coordinator)
City of Corvallis 
and  Philomath 
Rural  Fire 
Protection 
District  officials 
'American Red 
Cross officials 
Oregon
Emergency
Management
Agency
(Population
Planner) 
FEMA Region X 
(State and Local 
Assistance 
representative) 
'Benton Co. 
Emergency 
Services  (Sheriff 
and  Coordinator) 
American Red 
Cross officials 
Oregon
Emergency

Management

Agency

(Population

Planner)
 
FEMA Region X
 
(State and Local
 
Assistance
 
representatives
 
Documents 
Reviewed plans
from other states 
(California, 
Florida, 
Tennessee, 
Washington,  and 
Hawaii) 
'Reviewed  plans 
from  other 
counties  in 
Oregon(Umatilla, 
Klamath, 
Deschutes, Baker 
and Lane) 
FEMA's Civil 
Preparedness 
Guides for State 
and Local 
Government 
FEMA's Federal 
Response  Plan 
'Professional 
journal  articles 
"Drafts of revised 
plans
'Newspaper
articles 
Participant
Observations 
Benton Co. 
Emergency 
Management 
Council bi­
monthly
meetings
County 
Commissioners 
meetings
(budgeting, 
planning,  and 
debriefing) 
"Drills  (e.g., 
Quake-X '94, 
Violence in  the 
Workplace)
Panel 
Discussion: 
"Government 
Facing  Disaster" 
Benton Co. 
Emergency
Management
Council bi­
monthly
meetings
Drills  (e.g., 
Quake-X '94, 
Violence in the 
Workplace) 154 
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Characteristics  Semi- Documents  Participant
Structured  Observations 
Interviews 
Leadership
Approach 
Citizen 
Involvement 
Benton Co. 
Emergency
Services 
(Coordinator) 
"Benton Co. 
Emergency
Management 
Council Chair 
'Benton Co. 
residents  and 
private
businesses 
'Oregon State 
Extension  staff 
'Books 
Professional 
journal  articles 
'Memos 
"When Disaster 
Strikes"  video 
FEMA Region X 
Mitigation 
Forum 
transcripts
Mountainview 
Elementary 
School Disaster 
Education Pilot 
Project 
'Portland NET 
Program
'Newspaper
articles 
Benton Co. 
Emergency
Management 
Council bi­
monthly
meetings
Oregon
Emergency
Management
Agency's 
Annual  Meeting 
for County
Emergency
Planners 
(Keynote
speaker-
Director FEMA)
'Panel 
Discussion: 
"Government 
Facing  Disaster" 
'Benton Co. Fair 
Booth 
'Earthquake
Seminar (1994­
1995) 
Corvallis Fire 
Dept. Open House 155 
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Characteristics
 
Role  of Experts
 
Outcome  of 
Planning 
Semi-
Structured 
Interviews 
Benton Co. 
Public Works 
(Engineering 
and  Coordinator)
City of Corvallis 
and  Philomath 
fire  marshals 
'Good Samaritan 
Hospital  officials 
'Professors  and 
graduate 
students at OSU 
"Employees at 
various  state 
agencies 
(Building Codes 
Agency; Dept. of 
Transportation; 
Dept. of Geology 
and  Mineral 
Industries;  Dept.
of Forestry)
'Planning
committee 
(annex)  chairs 
'Benton Co. 
Emergency 
Services 
(Coordinator)
Oregon
Emergency
Management
Agency
(Population
Planner) 
FEMA Region X 
(State and Local 
Assistance 
representative) 
Documents
 
1984 and 1994 
Hazard Analyses
for Benton 
County 
Current source 
maps (USGS; Soil 
Conservation 
Service; FEMA 
Floodplain Maps; 
Dept. of
Forestry) 
DOGAMI and 
USGS 
publications 
(Oregon Geology
and Earthquakes
and Volcanoes) 
'Former  civil 
defense  plans 
'Drafts of revised 
plan 
'Oregon 401 
Series (1993
legislature)
'Stafford Act and 
amendments 
'Flow charts 
'Newspaper and 
journal  articles 
Participant
Observations 
Public  seminars 
and  lectures 
discussing
earthquakes,
tsunamis, 
flooding,  and 
forest  fires 
FEMA's 
Professional 
Development 
Series (PDS) 
Emergency
Planning 
Courses 
'Benton Co. 
Emergency 
Management
Council bi­
monthly
meetings 
FEMA Region X
Mitigation
Forum 156 
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Benton County Emergency Management Council Citizen Survey 
Benton County is currently involved in updating and 
modernizing its plan for handling major emergencies.  The 
Emergency Management Council (made up county and local services 
that would be involved during an emergency), is emphasizing family 
and neighborhood preparedness as the heart of its program.  Studies 
show that 80% of those called on to deal with critical disaster 
situations  at least in the first hours  are citizens like yourselves. 
Government and professional services can neither meet all the needs, 
nor should individuals yield all responsibility for their own welfare. 
Governments must focus on the worst cases and those most central to 
the welfare of all.  Citizens must take responsibility to prepare 
themselves and families.  We must all work together for a safer, 
more prepared community. 
Some communities have organized neighborhood groups 
around emergency preparedness, others use already existing 
neighborhood associations.  Whatever arrangements, the Council is 
encouraging neighborhood preparedness and seeks to educate and 
coordinate with those willing to plan.  The Council wants feedback on 
your interests and your opinions on how we might best organize to 
plan for an earthquake, fire, hazardous materials spill, flood, etc. 
1. Do you think an existing organization in your neighborhood 
such as a home owners association or Neighborhood Watch 
would be willing to engage in emergency preparedness 
planning and training? 
2. If no organization exists, do you think you neighborhood 
would be willing to engage in an emergency preparedness 
planning/training  committee? 
3. Would you be willing to help organize your neighborhood? 
4. Other than neighborhoods, is there another way you would 
suggest to organize for emergency preparedness? 
Thank you for your response.  Please drop in a box as you exit the 
auditorium. 157 
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Transcript from "When Disaster Strikes" Video (Segment of Benton 
County) 
In an actual disaster, protection is more than a government 
responsibility.  It is up to us as individuals, families, and neighbors to 
know what we need to do to protect ourselves. 
In Corvallis, Oregon, in a church meeting room, an unusual 
meeting of city and county agencies involved in emergency 
management is taking place.  Unusual because the officials are being 
brought together by a Corvallis homemaker, (Key Informant). 
(Key Informant): "As a mom, as a wife, and as a homemaker in 
this community, what is it that I need to know? What is it that I 
need to have? And so I look at you and all of your ideas and all of 
your programs and I say, 'help.' 
During the course of the two-hour meeting the participants 
share information and ideas about emergency preparedness, and 
come to two conclusions: The first, local families need more 
information on how to prepare for disasters, and survive on their 
own. 
(Public safety official): "But the real principle focus that I am 
picking up on this is the public needs to know what is there for them. 
And they also need to know the fact there is a certain amount of 
self-help that needs to occur." 
The second conclusion: It will take the active involvement of 
concerned citizens like (Key Informant) to get a community 
awareness program up and running.  The group decides to create a 
community-wide task force on citizen preparedness, and they agree 
to meet again .... 158 
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June 17, 1995
 
Jim Swinyard 
Benton County Emergency Services 
Law Enforcement Building 
Corvallis, Oregon  97330 
Dear Mr. Swinyard, 
I applaud your efforts with involving more of the community 
in disaster planning in Benton County.  It was interesting for me to 
study the disaster planning process and emerging approach that 
yourself and the Benton County Emergency Management Council 
have been undertaking.  Thank you for allowing me to read files, 
work plans, and planning manuals, and to observe meetings, drills, 
and training sessions.  Likewise, I appreciate your time to discuss 
and verify information about Benton County's disaster preparedness 
program.  From my research, I would make a few constructive 
recommendations for your community-based program. 
As the county emergency services coordinator, you are aware 
that disaster planning is a complicated task.  In the past, the public 
has been apathetic and has expected government to "bail them out" 
during disasters.  Overcoming these obstacles and reaching out to the 
community is difficult, but necessary in order for the public, private, 
and volunteer groups to share the responsibility for disaster 
preparedness.  Including volunteers in the planning process is 
difficult because they require additional training and are not held 
accountable to formal guidelines.  Moreover, managing twenty-two 
functional planning committees has been hard because disaster 
planning responsibilities are added to their daily tasks.  Overall, it 
has been cumbersome to solely oversee that individuals and groups 
(public, private, or volunteer) complete their sections of the plan. 
If possible, I would suggest that you and the Council consider 
three recommendations.  First, you could recruit people who have 
previously experienced a disaster to assist you with convincing 
others about the importance of disaster planning.  In addition, they 
could motivate and educate others about disaster preparedness by 
sharing hardships and benefits from prior experiences. 159 
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The second recommendation is to look at how you and the 
Council work with volunteers in emergency management.  Two 
advantages of broadening disaster preparedness to the community 
are an expanded resource base and improved response capabilities. 
However, there have been problems with group organization and 
decision-making when more people are involved.  I would suggest 
that you and the Council continue to have diverse representation in 
the disaster planning process.  There is a potential for a follow-up 
study by another student to find additional ways to make this 
effective. 
Lastly, citizens may not be aware of the benefits with 
structural and non-structural mitigation efforts.  For instance, during 
an April 11, 1995, meeting, Fire Chief Van Pelt noted that Benton 
County has lower incidents of structural fires in comparison to 
adjacent counties due to a 90-year-old building code requirement. I 
suggest that you and the Council consider looking at the benefits of 
mitigation efforts for all hazards in Benton County. 
Again, our interviews were most helpful for gathering 
information about community-based emergency preparedness in 
Benton County.  Best of luck with your programs and activities in the 
future, and please keep in touch. 
Sincerely, 
Colleen Kinney 
MAIS graduate student 
cc:  Benton County Emergency Management Council Chair; FEMA 
Region X State and Local Planner 
Redacted for privacy